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States, Preemption, and Patented Drug Prices
Rebecca E. Wolitz*
The enormous cost of patented medications is severely straining state
budgets. Covering a single treatment might cost a state upwards of half a
billion dollars, and states therefore confront difficult choices between
restricting access to life-saving treatments and defunding other important
health services or even schools and infrastructure programs. In light of
federal regulatory abdication, states are experimenting with a diversity of
cost-containment and fair-pricing efforts. State-level reform, however,
confronts the headwinds of patent preemption. As patent rights are
federally conferred, how—if at all—may states regulate excessively priced
patented medications?
This Article begins from the premise that the federal patent system is
best understood as being charged with sufficiently incentivizing
innovation. Thus, excessively rewarding patent holders is not among its
aims. From this premise, I advance three main arguments. First,
excessively priced patented medications are at odds with the public
purposes of the patent system. They are further unfair to patients and
health systems against the background of their widespread
unaffordability. For these reasons, drug price regulation is warranted.
Second, the federal government should be the one to comprehensively
address the problem of excessively priced patented medications, but
congressional action has been politically stalled and uncertain. State-level
interventions offer the possibility of second-best solutions. Yet, though
states are the locus of drug pricing reform, their degrees of regulatory
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freedom are constrained by misguided Federal Circuit precedent.
Consequently, federal regulatory failure is compounded by neutered state
regulation.
Third, states should not be preempted by federal patent law from
addressing the urgent problem of excessively priced patented medications.
Their exclusion is neither doctrinally required nor desirable public policy.
Unfettered by patent preemption, state regulation holds the promise of
improving physical and fiscal health as well as manifesting an
overwhelming bipartisan preference for drug pricing reform.
States further have valuable contributions to make to federal
pharmaceutical innovation policy. States have an underappreciated role
to play in recalibrating federal patent policy away from the privileging of
private interests and aligning it with its intended public-serving purpose.
They have important contributions to make to national conversations
about innovation incentives and fair drug pricing. To the extent states are
patent preempted from regulation reaching patented drug prices, this is a
significant and unwarranted missed opportunity both to meet the urgent
needs of Americans and to pursue the best version of our federal
pharmaceutical innovation policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Expensive prescription drugs are imposing seemingly needless
hardship and sorrow on American patients, families, and health
systems.1 The origins of specific drug pricing controversies differ, but
extremely expensive patented prescription drugs present a recurrent
problem for patients and health systems alike.2 New drugs account for
a dramatically disproportionate share of drug spending.3 More broadly,
patented medications comprise the bulk of prescription spending
despite being a minority of prescriptions.4 In 2019, for instance, 80
percent of U.S. prescription drug spending was on branded
medications.5 Yet, branded medications represented only 9.8 percent of
prescriptions dispensed.6 In brief, patented medications are expensive,
and many believe that they are excessively, unfairly so.
Given the federal nature of patents, one might reasonably expect
the federal government to craft careful, comprehensive, and powerful
solutions to the problem of excessively priced patented medications. A
national policy solution is preferable morally and doctrinally. Yet,
despite federal bipartisan support for drug pricing reform, to date,
Congress and the executive branch have largely failed to act. Federal
drug pricing reform remains underpowered and uncertain, and with
multiple crises spanning political insurrection, climate change,
immigration, and an ongoing pandemic, it is unclear whether reform
will occur in the near future, let alone be meaningful. This state of affairs
necessitates a search for interim second-best solutions.

1 See, e.g., Our Stories, PATIENTS FOR AFFORDABLE DRUGS, https://patientsforaffordable
drugs.org/our-stories/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2021) (collecting patient narratives
describing the impact of expensive medications).
2 Aaron S. Kesselheim, Jerry Avorn & Ameet Sarpatwari, The High Cost of
Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858,
859 (2016).
3 Although specialty drugs accounted for approximately 1 percent of Medicare Part
D and Medicaid prescriptions, they account for 30 percent of net spending. See Huseyin
Naci & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Specialty Drugs—A Distinctly American Phenomenon, 382
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2179, 2179 (2020) (citing CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PRICES FOR AND
SPENDING ON SPECIALITY DRUGS IN MEDICARE PART D AND MEDICAID 1 (2019)).
4 BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD, HEALTH OF AMERICA REPORT, RISING COSTS FOR PATENTED DRUGS
DRIVE GROWTH OF PHARMACEUTICAL SPENDING IN THE U.S. 1 (2017), https://www.bcbs.com/
the-health-of-america/reports/rising-costs-patented-drugs-drive-growth-pharmaceutical-spending-us (finding that single-source patented drugs make up less than 10
percent of filled prescriptions, but a staggering 63 percent of drug spending).
5 IQVIA INST., MEDICINE SPENDING AND AFFORDABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (2020),
https://www.iqvia.com/insights/the-iqvia-institute/reports/medicine-spending-andaffordability-in-the-us. Branded drugs commonly coincide with patented drugs.
6 Id.
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In a federal system, the possibility of state-level intervention offers
a promising alternative in light of politically stalled and limited federal
reform. States, in fact, have been experimenting with various tools to
address the problem of excessively priced medications. Further, in
contrast to the federal government, states have the demonstrated
political ability to enact a variety of drug pricing reforms.
States have a particular interest in the pricing of patented
medications. High prescription drug prices impose great personal costs
on constituents and systemic costs on state budgets.7 In 2016, for
instance, Louisiana was grappling with how to pay for Hepatitis C
medications.8 The state would need to spend an estimated $760 million
to treat all infected Medicaid enrollees and its uninsured, which was
more than Louisiana’s expenditures on “K-12 education, Veteran’s
Affairs, and Corrections combined.”9 Paying for these medications
would mean defunding other important programs.10 More recently,
given its low clinical value, high price, and potentially sizable patient
population, the FDA’s controversial accelerated approval of Aduhelm
(an Alzheimer’s drug) is raising significant concerns about its costs for
Medicaid programs.11 Outside of Medicaid, states experience significant
drug spending through correctional facilities as well as through
employee and retiree health benefits.12 State legislators, further,
7 See Trish Riley & Sarah Lanford, States on the Front Line: Addressing America’s
Drug Pricing Problem, 39 J. LEG. MED. 81, 82 (2019).
8 Rebekah E. Gee, Louisiana’s Journey Toward Eliminating Hepatitis C, HEALTH AFFS.
BLOG (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190327.
603623/full.
9 Id.
10 Sarah Jane Tribble, Louisiana Proposes Tapping a Federal Law to Slash Hepatitis C
Drug Prices, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 4, 2017), https://khn.org/news/louisiana-proposes-tapping-a-federal-law-to-slash-hepatitis-c-drug-prices/; Louisiana Budget Allocator, DRUG PRICING LAB, https://drugpricinglab.org/tools/louisiana-budget-allocator/
[hereinafter LOUISIANA BUDGET ALLOCATOR].
11 See Rachel Dolan & Elizabeth Williams, How Might the FDA’s Approval of a New
Alzheimer’s Drug Impact Medicaid?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (July 13, 2021), https://
www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/how-might-the-fdas-approval-of-a-new-alzheimers-drug-impact-medicaid/.
12 PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PHARMACEUTICALS IN STATE PRISONS 1, 3 (2017), https://
www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2017/12/pharmaceuticals-in-state-prisons.pdf
(noting twenty-one departments of corrections “named drug costs as one of their
agency’s primary health cost drivers” and showing, e.g., 32 percent of NY’s 2015 prison
health care spending on prescription drugs); Anne C. Spaulding et al., Funding Hepatitis
C Treatment in Correctional Facilities by Using a Nominal Pricing Mechanism, 25 J. CORR.
HEALTH CARE 15, 16 (2019) (observing that HCV medications “can still outstrip prison
budgets”); Jon Lender, Prescription Drug Spending for State Employees Runs Wild, Despite
Cost-Saving Efforts, HARTFORD COURANT (Dec. 6, 2015, 7:56 AM), https://
www.courant.com/politics/hc-lender-prescription-drug-costs-1206-20151205column.html; TEX. COMPTROLLER, TEXAS HEALTH CARE SPENDING REPORT FISCAL 2015, at 13, 17,
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frequently hear from their constituents about affordability challenges
stemming from the costs of their prescription medications.13
State budget shortfalls and challenges are likely to be exacerbated
in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. At the beginning of the pandemic,
states were facing “unprecedented” levels of lost revenue.14 Moreover,
millions of Americans lost their jobs,15 and “the employment rate
remains below pre-pandemic levels” with “millions still report[ing] that
their households did not get enough to eat or are not caught up on rent
payments.”16 As they lost their jobs due to COVID-19, many Americans
became vulnerable to losing their health insurance as well.17 Between
February 2020 and April 2021, total Medicaid/CHIP enrollment grew by
11 million, or 15.5 percent.18 Thus, the expense of patented medications
remains an issue of significance, if not urgency, for individuals and
states alike.

33, 36 (2017); CalPERS Delays Launch of Two Programs to Lower Drug Costs, CHIEF INV.
OFFICER (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.ai-cio.com/news/calpers-delays-launch-twoprograms-lower-drug-costs/; Chad Terhune, CalPERS Taps UnitedHealth to Run Its
Prescription Drug Business, CAL. HEALTHLINE (May 18, 2016), https://
californiahealthline.org/news/calpers-taps-unitedhealth-to-run-its-prescription-drugbusiness/; Chad Terhune, Specialty Drugs Costs Soar 30% for California Pension Fund,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 28, 2016), https://khn.org/news/specialty-drug-costs-soar30-for-california-pension-fund/; Erin Alberty, Prescriptions from Mexico? Utah is Paying
Public Employees to Make the Trip, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 5, 2020), https://
www.sltrib.com/mexico-pharmacy-tourism/.
13 See, e.g., Dana Gentry, Prescription Drug Prices Make Americans Sick, Regardless of
Politics, NEV. CURRENT (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.nevadacurrent.com/2019/08/21/
prescription-drug-prices-make-americans-sick-regardless-of-politics/.
14 Allan Smith, ‘Unprecedented’: States Face Hundreds of Billions in Lost Revenue, NBC
News Finds, NBC NEWS (May 17, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politicsnews/unprecedented-states-face-hundreds-billions-lost-revenue-nbc-news-findsn1206316.
15 CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES GRAPPLING WITH HIT TO TAX
COLLECTIONS (2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/statesgrappling-with-hit-to-tax-collections.
16 CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, TRACKING THE COVID-19 ECONOMY’S EFFECTS ON
FOOD, HOUSING, AND EMPLOYMENT HARDSHIPS, https://www.cbpp.org/research/povertyand-inequality/tracking-the-covid-19-economys-effects-on-food-housing-and
(last
updated Oct. 21, 2021).
17 Approximately 5.4 million workers became uninsured due to loss of employment
between February and May of 2020. FAMILIES USA, THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND RESULTING
ECONOMIC CRASH HAVE CAUSED THE GREATEST HEALTH INSURANCE LOSSES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 3
(2020), https://www.familiesusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/COV-254_Cover
age-Loss_Report_7-17-20.pdf.
18 Bradley Corallo & Avirut Mehta, Analysis of Recent National Trends in Medicaid and
CHIP Enrollment, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 21, 2021), https://www.kff.org/coronaviruscovid-19/issue-brief/analysis-of-recent-national-trends-in-medicaid-and-chip-enrollment/.
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State-level reform, however, confronts the headwinds of patent
preemption. As patent rights are federally conferred, how—if at all—
may states regulate excessively priced patented medications?
This Article analyzes state excessive drug pricing reforms at the
intersection of federal patent law. It advances three main arguments.
First, excessively priced patented medications are at odds with the
public purposes of the patent system. Further, against a background of
their widespread unaffordability, excessively priced patented
medications are unfair to patients and health systems. For these
reasons, drug price regulation is warranted.
Second, the federal government should address the problem of
excessively priced patented medications, but congressional action
continues to face significant political challenges.
State-level
interventions therefore offer the possibility of second-best solutions.19
Although states are the locus of drug pricing reform, their degrees of
regulatory freedom are constrained by misguided Federal Circuit
precedent. Consequently, federal regulatory failure is compounded by
neutered state regulation.
Third, states should not be preempted on the grounds of federal
patent law from addressing the urgent problem of excessively priced
patented medications. Their exclusion is neither doctrinally required
nor desirable public policy. Unfettered by patent preemption, state
regulation holds the promise of improving physical and fiscal health as
well as manifesting an overwhelming bipartisan preference for drug
pricing reform.
States further have valuable contributions to make to federal
biopharmaceutical innovation policy. States have an underappreciated
role to play in recalibrating federal patent policy away from the
privileging of private interests and aligning it with its intended publicserving purpose. They have important contributions to make to
national conversations about innovation incentives and fair drug
pricing. Under present circumstances, to the extent states are patent
preempted from regulation reaching patented drug prices, this is a
significant and unwarranted missed opportunity both to meet the
urgent needs of Americans and to pursue the best version of our federal
pharmaceutical innovation policy.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II establishes the
underlying public purpose of federal patent law. It begins from the

19 The phrase “second-best” is not intended to confer a meaning of “not very good.”
To quite the contrary, the second-best solutions discussed herein are thoughtful
attempts to implement important and meaningful policies in light of federal inaction.
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premise that patents serve a public purpose.20 Their purpose is not the
accretion of private wealth or the enrichment of inventors, but rather
the promotion of inventions.21 As such, the federal patent system is best
understood as being charged with sufficiently incentivizing innovation.
A purpose to excessively reward patent holders is not among the aims of
federal patent policy. I argue that excessiveness can be defined by
reference to the goals of federal patent law itself, suggesting a model of
cost-plus pricing. As such, excessive pricing is not identical to supracompetitive pricing.
Overcompensation of patent holders is
unwarranted by reference to the aims of federal patent law and morally
problematic when such overcompensation further renders important
medications unaffordable.
I make a prima facie case that
overcompensation of drug manufacturers occurs and conclude that
such situations are ripe for regulation. This section further observes
that present federal limits placed on high drug prices, facilitated by drug
manufacturers’ patent rights, are nearly nonexistent.
Part III presents the possibility of state regulation as a second-best
solution. This Part discusses second-best solutions and argues both for
a preference for federal intervention over state intervention and for a
preference for price regulation over payment regulation. This Part
further discusses state experimentation with excessive price and
payment legislation. It then turns to the doctrinal issue of patent
preemption. It analyzes the practical barrier to state regulation posed
by Federal Circuit precedent in BIO v. D.C.22 and argues that this
precedent is misguided. State excessive price regulation should not be
preempted. Patent preemption is neither doctrinally required nor good
public policy.
Part IV then considers how states may move forward in light of this
precedent. This Part considers five options available to states: (1)
congressional amendment; (2) the shield of sovereign immunity; (3)
reformulated excessive price regulations; (4) tax penalties on excessive
price increases; and (5) payment regulation. It ultimately argues that
payment regulation, at this time, is likely the least risky and most
expedient comprehensive option for state-level drug pricing reform that
avoids patent preemption. This Part concludes by considering the
broader themes at issue in conceptualizing the role of states as
participants in federal patent innovation policy through the vehicle of
drug pricing reform. States have valuable roles to play as participants
in federal patent policy and national conversations on fair drug pricing.
20
21
22

See infra Section II.B.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

WOLITZ (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

11/12/21 3:38 PM

PATENTED DRUG PRICES

393

Two caveats to this article’s arguments and discussions are in
order. First, this discussion focuses exclusively on the issue of patent
preemption. This focus does not mean that other issues are
unimportant or even non-dispositive. For instance, in addition to
surviving patent preemption, state-level price or payment regulations
will also need to survive the dormant Commerce Clause. In light of
Maryland’s generic anti-price-gouging law’s failure in the Fourth Circuit
on these grounds,23 there is credible reason to think that such challenges
may not be insignificant.
Second, this Article primarily contemplates state reform efforts
outside the context of Medicaid. Yet, there is considerable change
occurring within state Medicaid programs with regard to prescription
drug payment. Many states are experimenting with value-based
contracting or cost review to secure supplemental rebates.24 As state
reforms made internal to a state-federal program raise separate
considerations, their discussion and evaluation are deferred.
As already emphasized, this Article contemplates state-level drug
pricing reform largely as a second-best solution. State-level regulation
is instrumentally valuable in achieving the desired policy goals of fairer
and less excessive patented drug prices. State participation in federal
pharmaceutical patent policy is also inherently valuable in its
expression of traditional values of federalism, such as local
experimentation and accountability. Yet, stemming the tide of
excessively high patented drug prices merits a national solution and not
a patchwork of varied responses. Resource-strapped states should not
have to take on one of the world’s most powerful industries so that their
constituents have reasonably affordable access to one of life’s
necessities. The federal government qua federal government is far
better placed to address these issues of national significance. The
problem of excessively priced patented medications is not the unique
problem of Californians or Virginians: it is a problem for Americans. In
the absence of comprehensive federal reform, however, states are not
waiting.25

23 See Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 667–74 (4th Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019).
24 See infra Section III.B.2.
25 See Riley & Lanford, supra note 7, at 93.
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II. DRUG PRICING, PATENT RIGHTS, AND FEDERAL REGULATORY FAILURE
A. The Moral Case for Government Intervention
This Article’s arguments for the examination and implementation
of excessive drug price regulation builds on a larger background theory
that supports the moral desirability of targeted price regulation.26
Targeted government regulation of excessively high prescription drug
prices can be justified on the basis of efficiency and fairness: the
overcompensation of patent holders is unsupported by reference to the
goals of federal patent law, and when patient affordability is further at
issue, such overcompensation is unfair.
Moral argument for excessive drug price regulation relies on the
assumption that prescription drugs are necessary goods. Though it can
be challenging to define the precise parameters of what is or is not a
necessity, necessary goods encompass—at the very least—those items
fundamental to survival, and arguably, good health.27 Even if not all
prescription medications are necessities, many are, and I shall leave that
assumption undisturbed.28
That prescription drugs are necessities means that we care about
their access and affordability in a way that we do not regarding
luxuries.29 As necessary goods, unaffordable prescription medications
can seem unfair.30 Their unaffordability appears to serve as a moral
inflection point.31 It might be thought of as a proxy for the imposition of
sacrifices that appear deeply unfair: the compelled sacrifice of other
necessities.32 In the case of prescription medications, unaffordability
26 See Rebecca E. Wolitz, Drug Manufacturers, Pricing, and Ethical Obligations 171
(July 26, 2021) (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with author); Michelle M.
Mello & Rebecca E. Wolitz, Legal Strategies for Reining in “Unconscionable” Prices for
Prescription Drugs, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 863–64 (2020) (putting forward five
commonsense assumptions regarding a workable excessive drug price regulation).
27 Cf. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, When Is the Price of a Drug Unjust? The Average Lifetime
Earnings Standard, 38 HEALTH AFFS. 604, 604 (2019) (arguing that many health care
goods are “necessary to live a decent human life”).
28 See, e.g., id.; see also Richard A. Spinello, Ethics, Pricing and the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 617, 621 (1992). For brevity, I will refer to prescription
medications as if all are necessities, with the caveat that particular instances may merit
closer inspection of this assumption.
29 See Emanuel, supra note 27.
30 Id.
31 Wolitz, Drug Manufacturers, Pricing, and Ethical Obligations, supra note 26, at 173.
32 Currently, no consensus view—either normative or empirical—exists as to what
it means to be an affordable medication. A few proposals have been made, including the
“average lifetime earnings standard” offered by Dr. Ezekiel Emanuel. See Emanuel, supra
note 27, at 604. The Institute for Clinical and Economic Review has also generated a
methodology for setting affordability and budgetary impact thresholds for the drugs it
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suggests that a patient must give up her medication itself or a necessity
of another kind. For instance, a patient may be compelled by the high
price of a prescription drug to choose between her medication and rent
when it is not possible to pay for both.33 In such a case, the patient faces
a tradeoff she ought not have to make. This idea has parallels with
institutions. A state, for instance, should not have to decide whether to
cover a single, yet important, medication or defund educational
programs or social services for vulnerable children.34
As the unaffordability of prescription medications can have many
causes, however, one cannot automatically conclude that if
unaffordability is unfair, the price of a medication is unfair.35 Yet, for a
category of cases, the conceptualization of unaffordability as indicative
of price unfairness is compelling. These are cases in which the price of
a medication already appears excessive by reference to independent
criteria. As argued in more detail below, in the case of patented
medications, the goals of the federal patent system can provide this
criterion: patent rewards that exceed those necessary to effectuate the
goals of federal patent law are excessive and overcompensate patent
holders.
Thus, when affordability challenges are overlaid upon excessive
patented drug pricing, additional justifications for regulation become
available. If the overcompensation of patent holders occurs, not only
evaluates. Steven D. Pearson, The ICER Value Framework: Integrating Cost Effectiveness
and Affordability in the Assessment of Health Care Value, 21 VALUE IN HEALTH 258, 259
(2018). Different conceptions of “affordable” have been offered in the adjacent
literature on affordable health insurance, but again there is no consensus view. Of those
accounts, a more plausible account offered by Carla Saenz, the “reasonable tradeoffs”
view, argues that health insurance is affordable if the purchaser need not forgo a benefit
of comparable value. She argues that a decent minimum of benefits from within each of
the categories of education, housing, nutrition, employment, safety, and affiliation offers
comparable benefits to health insurance. Carla Saenz, What is Affordable Health
Insurance? The Reasonable Tradeoff Account of Affordability, 19 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J.
401, 408 (2009). Applying this account to prescription drug pricing, medications would
be deemed unaffordable if the costs of a patient’s medications forced her to give up the
benefits of a decent minimum of a comparable benefit in one of the identified categories.
33 Michael Sainato, ‘Medication or Housing’: Why Soaring Insulin Prices Are Killing
Americans, GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2019, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
society/2019/sep/23/diabetes-americans-soaring-insulin-prices; Jo Ann Jenkins,
Prescription Drug Prices Are Out of Control, CNN (Mar. 17, 2019), https://
www.cnn.com/2019/03/17/opinions/prescription-drug-pricing-out-of-controljenkins/index.html (“[T]oo often older people face the grim reality of having to choose
between paying for their medicines and paying for food or rent.”).
34 See LOUISIANA BUDGET ALLOCATOR, supra note 10.
35 Wolitz, supra note 26, at 166–68; see NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., MAKING
MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE 1 (Norman R. Augustine et al. eds., 2018)
(“Affordability, however, is a complex function of factors, including not just the prices of
the drugs themselves[] . . . .”).
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would regulation be justified as a countermeasure to inefficiency by
reference to the purposes of federal patent law and policy, but
government regulation would be justified as a correction to unfairness.
When actual prices for patented medications exceed both the affordable
price and the non-excessive price, those prices are not simply utterly
unwarranted, they are also unfair.36 Patients should not have to choose
between necessities, such as medicine and housing or food (nor states
between coverage of a single drug and programs for children). Further,
it is unjustified for the government to permit, through a lack of
regulation, the imposition of these bleak circumstances if
manufacturers are already overcompensated by reference to the goals
of the federal patent scheme that facilitates this ability to overcharge in
the first instance. Regulation of prices down to the affordable price is
therefore justified on the basis of unfairness to patients and institutions.
Regulation down to the non-excessive price is justified on grounds of
efficiency, and in some cases, unfairness as well.37
Whether government regulation in cases of excessively priced
patented medications is justified on grounds of efficiency or fairness,
however, two showings must be made. First, it must be demonstrated
that overcompensation of patent holders is not among the purposes of
federal patent law. This issue becomes of particular importance
doctrinally for a patent preemption analysis. If federal patent law aims
to provide patent holders with wholly unrestricted rewards, normative
arguments against this position are preserved, but doctrinal arguments
will flounder. Second, to justify governmental intervention, at least a
prima facie case must be made that the overcompensation of patent

36 Wolitz, Drug Manufacturers, Pricing, and Ethical Obligations, supra note 26, at 204;
see also Suerie Moon, Stephanie Mariat, Isao Kamae & Hanne Bak Pedersen, Defining the
Concept of Fair Pricing for Medicines, 368 BMJ 1 (2020) (proposing a fair drug pricing
framework where a drug price floor fair to sellers is dictated by costs and a fair profit,
and a drug price ceiling fair to buyers is defined by reference to affordability).
37 When the affordable price is less than the price at which sufficient incentives are
provided through patent rewards, it would appear unfair to price in excess of the
“sufficient” price. Wolitz, Drug Manufacturers, Pricing, and Ethical Obligations, supra
note 26, at 171, 191 (making a similar argument). A further wrinkle is how we ought to
think about regulation of the surplus between the “sufficient” price (that is, the nonexcessive price of a patented drug) and the affordable price, when the affordable price
exceeds the sufficient price. Unless the affordable price is also the non-excessive
patented price, this leaves a gap between the non-excessive patented price and the
affordable price. It is tempting to think that any price above the sufficient price is unfair.
On such a view, government regulation down to the sufficient price is not merely
justified on the basis of efficiency, but also unfairness. As I argue elsewhere, however,
defending such an argument is more difficult that one might expect. Prices above the
sufficient price but below the affordable price are not obviously unfair, and an additional
allocative principle is required. Id. at 192.
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holders occurs. If patented drug prices are not excessive, justification of
government regulation on the basis of patent law efficiency or price
unfairness grounded in unaffordability are attenuated.
B. The Public Purpose of Patent Rights
Patent rights are temporally limited rights of exclusion granted by
the federal government in exchange for the public disclosure of an
invention. Congressional authority to grant patents derives from the
Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution. This
Clause provides: “The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”38 Congress created a statutory scheme implementing
this Constitutional power. By statute, patent holders may exclude
“whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention . . . .”39
Despite being rights of exclusion, patent rights are often confused
with rights to an economic monopoly.40 Yet, patent rights are not
monopoly rights.41 The difference is subtle, but its implications vast.
Patents can, and do, enable monopolies when market conditions permit,
but the rights themselves are not rights to an economic monopoly.
Rights to an economic monopoly suggest affirmative rights to occupy a
marketplace and further the absence of competition.42 But “a patent
does not grant the right to make, use, and sell the invention.”43 A patent
right, as an exclusive right, merely allows a patent holder to prevent

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
40 See Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis
of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1729 (2000); see also Giles S. Rich, The
Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws - Part II, 14 FED. CIR. B.J.
21, 32 (2004).
41 Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U.
CHI. L. REV. 999, 1010–11 (2014); Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades
of Meaning, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2008).
42 The difference between FDA marketing and data exclusivity might prove a helpful
analogy. Marketing exclusivity, for example, provided by the Orphan Drug Act prevents
competition from “the same drug for the same disease or condition” by preventing
approval during the exclusivity period. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a). By contrast, with data
exclusivity, generic competitors are precluded from seeking FDA approval during the
data exclusivity term if they rely on the originator’s data. See, e.g., Erika Lietzan, The
Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 103 (2016) (discussing this
distinction).
43 Feldman, supra note 41, at 8.
38
39
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others from undertaking activities that fall within the scope of a
patent.44
Consequently, patents do not guarantee their holders any
particular economic benefits, let alone any economic benefits at all.45
For instance, there may be no market for a patented product.46 Or,
despite the existence of patents, the market might be competitive in
light of non-infringing products.47 In the prescription drug context, the
recent competition between hepatitis C treatments illustrates this
point.48 Though Gilead Sciences was first to market, AbbVie eventually
offered a competing treatment.49
Nevertheless, particularly in the absence of non-infringing
competition,50 patents create opportunities for monopoly pricing.51
Monopoly pricing comes at a predictable cost: “some people who would
be willing to pay more than the marginal cost of a copy of the idea will
not be able to access it.”52 When the patented goods involved are
necessities, as many patented medications arguably are,53 the human
consequences are significant. At the individual level, a patent holder’s
Rich, supra note 40, at 27–29, 31 (collecting cases articulating patent rights as
rights of exclusion).
45 See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1537 (2017)
(“But the Patent Act does not guarantee a particular price.”); Feldman, supra note 41, at
11; Robin Feldman, Betty Chang Rowe, Rabiah Oral, Amy Y. Gu & Katherine Gudiksen,
The Patent Act and the Constitutionality of State Pharmaceutical Regulation, 45 RUTGERS
COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 40, 45 (2019); Joshua D. Sarnoff, BIO v. DC and the New Need to
Eliminate Federal Patent Law Preemption of State and Local Price and Product
Regulation, 2007 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 30, 33–34 (2007).
46 See Frederick M. Abbott, Excessive Pharmaceutical Prices and Competition Law:
Doctrinal Development to Protect Public Health, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 281, 287 (2016)
(noting that originator pricing is subject to demand).
47 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 147 (2013) (“And even a valid patent confers
no right to exclude products or processes that do not actually infringe.”); Abbott, supra
note 46, at 286–87.
48 Kesselheim et al., supra note 2, at 861.
49 Id.
50 Even with competition between patented medications, downward pricing
pressure is often modest. Id.; Jonathan J. Darrow & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Policy Options
Paper, Promoting Competition to Address Pharmaceutical Prices, HEALTH AFFS. (Mar.
15, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20180116.967310/full/.
Moreover, in many instances there may be no close substitutes. Hannah Brennan, Amy
Kapczynski, Christine H. Monahan & Zain Rizvi, A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing:
Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 275, 285 (2016).
51 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 44–45 (2004).
52 Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 131 (2004).
53 See, e.g., Emanuel, supra note 27, at 606; Richard A. Spinello, Ethics, Pricing and
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 617, 619 (1992).
44
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decision to charge what the market will bear can literally be the
difference between life and death.54 At the state level, it can compel
officials to confront a tragic set of choices: does one defund education
and infrastructure or restrict access to a life-saving treatment?55
These tragic choices imposed on individuals and states by the
existing federal statutory scheme raise significant questions about the
purpose of this regime in the first instance. One could be forgiven for
thinking that patents are merely tools for promoting private wealth.
Consider, as but one example, the “best-selling drug” in the United
States, AbbVie’s Humira.56 Humira treats many different kinds of
autoimmune diseases, and from 2012 to 2018, this drug generated in
excess of $56 billion in the United States alone.57 Humira is protected
by more than one hundred patents, and this “make[s] it difficult (if not
impossible) to sell competing drugs.”58 AbbVie’s executives have
acknowledged that the company’s patent strategy is to stall competitors
for as long as possible.59 Meanwhile, “when it comes to Humira, Abbvie
[sic] sales have paid off the research and development costs multiple
times over with plenty leftover for billions of dollars in profits.”60 A
recent congressional investigation of Humira estimates that AbbVie’s
anti-competitive conduct involving this single drug has cost the U.S.
health care system $19 billion.61
Yet while patent holders can and do make extraordinary returns
off their ability to exclude others, the accretion of private wealth is not

54 See, e.g., Shraddha Chakradhar, ‘Maisie’s Army’: How a Grassroots Group Is
Mobilizing to Help Toddlers Access a Lifesaving Drug, STAT NEWS (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/08/20/maisies-army-zolgensma-access-spinalmuscular-atrophy/; Emma Court, ‘Like We Were Being Forced to Gamble with Our Son’s
Life’: Health Insurers Won’t Pay for a $2.1 Million Drug for Kids, and Parents Say They’re
Running out of Time, BUS. INSIDER (July 26, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/
health-insurance-companies-deny-kids-with-sma-gene-therapy-zolgensma-2019-7.
55 See, e.g., LOUISIANA BUDGET ALLOCATOR, supra note 10.
56 In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 3d 811, 820 (N.D. Ill.
2020).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 819.
59 Id. at 823–24.
60 Bruce Japsen, Why Abbvie May Have a Tough Time Defending Humira’s Price Before
Congress, FORBES (Feb. 26, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/
2019/02/26/why-abbvie-may-have-a-tough-time-defending-humiras-price-beforecongress/?sh=3bec5b852fd3; see also Cynthia Koons, This Shield of Patents Protects the
World’s Best-Selling Drug, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-07/this-shield-of-patents-protects-the-world-sbest-selling-drug.
61 STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & REFORM, 117TH CONG., DRUG PRICING INVESTIGATION:
ABBVIE—HUMIRA AND IMBRUVICA, at v (2021).
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the purpose of patent law.62 Rather, federal patent law’s purpose is
dominantly public,63 and its fundamental objectives are well
established.64
Patent law as an instrumental tool in the service of public ends is
evidenced by the text of the Constitution,65 United States Supreme Court
precedent, and academic consensus. The purpose of the Intellectual
Property Clause “on its face . . . is to promote the public interest through
an increase of the public domain or commons of intellectual ideas and
thought.”66 Likewise, the Supreme Court stated that the “limited and
temporary monopoly granted to inventors was never designed for their
exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to the public or community at
large was another and doubtless the primary object in granting and
securing that monopoly.”67 Patents by their “very nature” are “affected
with a public interest” and “a special privilege designed to serve the
public purpose of promoting the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”68
The Court more specifically articulated that federal patent law
serves three objectives: (1) to foster and reward innovation, (2) to
promote the disclosure of inventions to stimulate further creation, and
(3) to assure that innovations in the public domain stay there.69 Each of
these purposes are public-minded; they do not reflect a purpose to
promote private gain, though private gain occurs along the way. Private
gains to inventors (and their investors), facilitated by patent protection,
are a means and not an end of the federal patent system.
Edward C. Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in
Historical Perspective (Part 1), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 763, 764 (2001); Feldman
et al., supra note 45, at 47.
63 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944).
64 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); see also Dan L. Burk
& Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2003).
65 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
66 Walterscheid, supra note 62, at 764.
67 Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327–28 (1858); see also Motion Picture Pats. Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (quoting Kendall, 62 U.S. at 327–28)
(Further observing that the Court “has consistently held that the primary purpose of our
patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents, but is ‘to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts.’”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (Intellectual property “privileges” are not
“primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a
means by which an important public purpose may be achieved.”). Note that Sony is a
copyright case, but discusses the constitutional clause and refers to “authors and
inventors.” Id. at 429–30.
68 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815–16
(1945); see also Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 344
(1971) (stating that a patent “is a privilege . . . conditioned by a public purpose”);
Feldman et al., supra note 45, at 47.
69 Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262; see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 64, at 1576.
62
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Further, the public purpose and instrumental nature of the patent
system is, by far, the “predominant” justification among
commentators.70 The “embarrassment”71 of a patent—that is, the social
costs imposed upon the public by rights of exclusion—is primarily
justified by reference to an incentive theory of patent law.72 Patent
rights purportedly play a necessary role in bringing forth new
knowledge goods, ultimately placed in the public domain, that might not
have existed in their absence.73 This role is the logic of having patented
prescription medications. Patent policy “tolerates” the allocative
inefficiencies of patients being priced out of their medications on the
assumption that “[t]he prospect of monopoly profits” offered by patent
protection is necessary to “create [a] drug in the first place. In other
words, the development of the drug is necessary to provide any access
at all.”74
Why emphasize the public purpose of federal patent law? If the
private reward of patent holders as an end in and of itself is not among
the purposes of federal patent law, claims that the potential rewards
offered by patent protection are untouchable—that they must be wholly
unlimited and unregulated—are weakened. Regulation of potential
patent rewards, consistent with the public objectives of the patent
system, is not only possible, but plausible. Such regulation is not
necessarily at odds with the purposes of patent law.
C. Excessive Compensation and Federal Abdication
Price regulation of patented medications raises a palpable worry:
won’t regulation of the potential rewards offered by patent protection
undermine the ability of patents to incentivize innovation? In the
pharmaceutical context—where the industry is both largely privatized
and financed through patent rents—this could negatively impact new
drug discovery.75 Claims that lower prices today will inevitably yield
70 Carrier, supra note 51, at 31–32 (“The utilitarian justification of providing
incentives to innovate, however, is the predominant justification for IP, one that is
consistent with the Constitution, that the courts have recognized, and that the academic
literature has tested.”).
71 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (quoting Thomas Jefferson and
discussing the purpose of the patent system).
72 Lemley, supra note 52, at 131; Roin, supra note 41, at 999.
73 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 52, at 129–30.
74 Mark A. Lemley, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & Rachel E. Sachs, The Medicare
Innovation Subsidy, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 75, 108–09 (2020).
75 Id. at 121 (noting that the United States “alone among developed countries”
allocates drugs mostly based on price); see Rahul K. Nayak, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S.
Kesselheim, Public Sector Financial Support for Late Stage Discovery of New Drugs in the
United States: Cohort Study, 367 BMJ (2019); see also Kesselheim et. al., supra note 2, at
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less innovative therapies tomorrow, is a well-worn mantra.76 If this
were true, patented price regulation could undermine the constitutional
goals of patents “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and the useful
[a]rts.”77
Yet, the public purposes of patent law suggest that its goals are best
understood as including a purpose to sufficiently incentivize innovation.
Excessive compensation of patent holders is notably absent from the
purposes of federal patent law, and consequently there is neither a
constitutional nor congressional mandate to compel users of patented
products to overpay through excessive pricing. To the contrary, “the
goal of intellectual property is only to provide the ‘optimal incentive,’
not the largest incentive possible.”78 The excessive compensation of
pharmaceutical patent holders through extraordinarily high prices,
therefore, ought not be beyond legal reproach. All the more so, given
their imposition of tragic costs.
What, then, counts as an excessive reward? This is a complicated
question. Nevertheless, the internal logic of federal patent law offers a
definition: patent rewards excessively compensate patentees when they
exceed those rewards necessary to incentivize the underlying invention
into existence.79 More specifically, benchmarking excessive pricing to
the purposes of the patent system is highly suggestive of a cost-plus
model of excessive drug pricing.80 When drug pricing exceeds a
manufacturer’s costs plus a reasonable profit, the price charged is
excessive.81 The aims of the patent system help define what constitutes

861–62 (stating that the industry is largely, but not exclusively privatized, and that
interactions between public and private financing for drugs are complex).
76 See, e.g., Rebecca E. Wolitz, A Corporate Duty to Rescue: Biopharmaceutical
Companies and Access to Medications, 94 IND. L. J. 1163, 1212–13 (2019); Michael A.
Carrier & Genevieve Tung, Opinion, The Industry that Cries Wolf: Pharma and Innovation,
STAT (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/09/26/innovation-boycried-wolf-pharma-industry/; Alex M. Azar II, Sec’y, Health & Hum. Servs., Remarks on
Drug Pricing Blueprint (May 14, 2018).
77 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
78 Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property
Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 125 (1999).
79 Cf. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Bayh-Dole Beyond Borders, 4 J.L.
BIOSCIENCES 1, 2 n.15 (2017) (defining “‘excessive’ rewards for knowledge-good
producers” as occurring when “the reward exceeds the amount needed to induce a
potential innovator to pursue a project”).
80 While some might subscribe to the view that cost-plus pricing serves as a
benchmark for determining fair or unfair drug pricing, here I adopt the language of
“excessive pricing” to distinguish such views from my own as laid out in Section II.A.
81 Drug development costs can be understood to include the cost of capital as well
as costs surrounding compound failures.
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a reasonable profit. A reasonable profit is one that, sufficiently, but not
excessively, incentivizes innovation.
This definition permits an important distinction. Excessive pricing
is not identical to supra-competitive pricing.82 Just because the
necessary incentives require supra-competitive pricing does not mean
such pricing is excessive. The concerns motivating justified government
intervention are not about patented medications simply being
expensive or priced above what one might expect in a competitive
market. The concerns that motivate and justify regulation pertain to
excessiveness and unfairness. Excessive patent holder compensation
defined by reference to the patent system is unnecessary to the
achievement of federal patent law’s objectives and may additionally be
morally condemnable as unfair. Regulation of excessive patented drug
prices, therefore, on this understanding of excessive, is compatible with
the purposes of federal patent law; it need not be at odds with patent
law’s goals of incentivizing innovation. Further, as argued above, when
affordability challenges also exist, price regulation can be morally
justified on fairness grounds.
A cost-plus perspective on excessive patented prescription drug
pricing furthermore, and incidentally, helps account for several
dominant themes in drug pricing debates. With respect to research and
development costs, it explains why the drug industry, at least
historically, has perpetuated the often questionable (yet chronic)
argument that high prices for prescription medications are necessary to
cover the costs of researching and developing important new
medications.83 While these arguments present foremost as a threat (“If
you cut our prices, you won’t have your new drugs”), they also can be
read as an attempt at price justification (“Our prices cannot be excessive
since they are related to our costs—and we just have a lot of costs”).84
The cost-plus perspective further helps explain concerns about
expensive medications in light of those drugs’ public financing.85 A
prevailing sentiment in public discourse is that the American public
“Excessive” pricing in this sense is somewhat agnostic as to the “value” of a new
invention. See generally Nicholson Price, The Cost of Novelty, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 769, 771
(2020) (discussing how patent law promotes innovation that is “new purely for the sake
of being new, and not better at all”).
83 Wolitz, Drug Manufacturers, Pricing, and Ethical Obligations, supra note 26, at
178–79; Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Big Pharma’s Go-To Defense of Soaring Drug Prices Doesn’t
Add Up, ATLANTIC (Mar. 23, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/
03/drug-prices-high-cost-research-and-development/585253/.
84 Wolitz, Drug Manufacturers, Pricing, and Ethical Obligations, supra note 26, at
178–79.
85 Id. at 179.
82
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unfairly “pays-twice” when privatized expensive patented medications
benefited from government funding.86 While this is fundamentally an
issue about the fair allocation of benefits relative to the contributions of
collaborators, it is also a complaint about excessive drug pricing on the
basis of costs.87 Part of these objections, arguably, is the thought that
drug manufacturers should not get to charge for costs paid by others;
when drug prices are higher because they do reflect such charges, those
prices are excessive.88
Even so, regulatory intervention premised on excessive pricing and
the overcompensation of patent holders requires a showing that the
antecedent condition of overcompensation occurs. Are pharmaceutical
patent holders overcompensated through patent facilitated monopoly
pricing? If patent holders are not excessively compensated, excessive
patented price regulation is a solution without a problem.
Broad generalizations about a varied and complex industry are
imprudent. The pharmaceutical industry, despite the existence of
patents, has clear market failures; in some cases, patents on their own
are insufficient to sustain or bring forth certain kinds of innovation.
Therapies for neglected diseases or those predominantly plaguing low
income populations are well-known examples.89 Antibiotics90 and
vaccines, paradoxically, offer others.91
Nevertheless, using cost recoupment as a benchmark suggests that
excessive drug manufacturer compensation by reference to the goals of
federal patent law are prima facie plausible.92 To begin with, a study of
returns on invested capital (“ROIC”) for large pharmaceutical
companies from 2009 to 2019 found that these companies had returns
exceeding those of all other sectors.93 Large pharmaceutical companies

Rebecca E. Wolitz, The Pay Twice Critique, Government Funding, and Reasonable
Pricing Clauses, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 177, 190 (2019).
87 Wolitz, Drug Manufacturers, Pricing, and Ethical Obligations, supra note 26, at 179.
88 Id.
89 Roin, supra note 41, at 1030; see also Lemley, Ouellette & Sachs, supra note 74, at
121 (discussing Chagas disease).
90 See Thomas J. Hwang, Daniel Carpenter & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Paying for
Innovation: Reimbursement Incentives for Antibiotics, 7 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., 1, 2 (Feb.
25, 2015).
91 See Ana Santos Rutschman, The Vaccine Race in the 21st Century, 61 ARIZ. L. REV.
729, 731 (2019).
92 Cf. Lemley, Ouellette & Sachs, supra note 74, at 117 (noting “[f]or at least some
drugs, patent-owner returns for pharmaceuticals seem to far exceed the risk-adjusted
R&D costs”).
93 SEAN DICKSON & JEROMIE BALLREICH, WEST HEALTH POL’Y CTR., HOW MUCH CAN PHARMA
LOSE? A COMPARISON OF RETURNS BETWEEN PHARMACEUTICAL AND OTHER INDUSTRIES 6, 9, 13
(2019).
86
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had an average ROIC of 17.3 percent.94 To achieve parity with the next
highest sector’s return of 15.3 percent, large pharmaceutical companies
would need to reduce their total profits by approximately $127 billion.95
Thus, these large companies could undergo significant profit reductions
and still be as or more lucrative than other industries. The study’s
authors therefore found that even with lower ROIC, “manufacturers
could still maintain a revenue level that is attractive to institutional
investors without reducing current expenditures for research and
development.”96
Other recent studies are further suggestive of the prima facie case.
Cancer drugs, for instance, are routinely priced in excess of $100,000
per year of treatment.97 Yet one study of such drugs found that while
the median cost of development was $648 million, median revenues
post-approval were $1658.4 million with a range up to $22,275
million.98 In aggregate, total revenue from the drugs studied was $67
billion compared with total research and development (“R&D”)
spending of $7.2 billion.99 The authors concluded that development
costs were “more than recouped” over a short period of time, and that
some companies saw revenue in excess of ten times their R&D costs,
representing “a sum not seen in other sectors of the economy.”100
Another study of ninety-nine FDA-approved cancer drugs likewise
found that every $1 spent on R&D generated a median of $14.50 in sales
income (with a range up to $55.10) for originator companies.101 These
authors likewise noted that these “supernormal returns . . . are much
higher than what would be considered a justifiable return required for
rewarding and incentivizing innovation, both in economic terms and by
reasonableness.”102 The authors were particularly concerned given the
lack of access globally to affordable cancer medications.103
Yet another analysis of the world’s twenty top-selling drugs
demonstrates that premium pricing in the U.S. market alone—the
Id. at 6.
Id. at 10.
96 Id. at 13.
97 Vinay Prasad & Sham Mailankody, Research and Development Spending to Bring a
Single Cancer Drug to Market and Revenues After Approval, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED.
1569, 1570 (2017).
98 Id. at 1572.
99 Id. at 1569, 1572.
100 Id. at 1574.
101 Kiu Tay-Teo, André Ilbawi & Suzanne R. Hill, Comparison of Sales Income and
Research and Development Costs for FDA-Approved Cancer Drugs Sold by Originator Drug
Companies, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Jan. 4, 2019, at 1, 5, 7.
102 Id. at 7.
103 Id.
94
95
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difference between U.S. prices and those paid in other countries for the
same drug—averaged 163 percent of drug manufacturers’ global R&D
expenditures.104 This analysis “counters the claim that the higher prices
paid by U.S. patients and taxpayers are necessary to fund research and
development. Rather, there are billions of dollars left over even after
worldwide research budgets are covered.”105 An even more recent
comparative country study found that U.S. prices for brand-name
originator drugs are 344 percent more expensive than those in thirtytwo comparison Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development countries.106 There are other examples.107 Further,
regular price increases by name brand companies, far in excess of
inflation, remain a common practice,108 with some companies even
continuing this practice during the current global pandemic.109
While broad claims of drug manufacturer overcompensation may
be unwarranted, the evidence suggests that this phenomenon exists. To
the extent it does exist, the situation is ripe for regulatory intervention.
Yet existing federal law is inadequate to meet the challenge.
The United States does not have a general scheme for regulating
drug prices. Rather, it has a patchwork of laws pertinent to prescription
drug pricing through existing patent law safeguards, laws facilitating
competition, and laws pertaining to drug pricing within federal payment

104 Nancy L. Yu, Zachary Helms & Peter B. Bach, R&D Costs for Pharmaceutical Companies Do Not Explain Elevated US Drug Prices, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170307.059036/full/.
105 Id.
106 Andrew E. Mulcahy et. al., International Prescription Drug Price Comparisons:
Current Empirical Estimates and Comparisons with Previous Studies, RAND CORP., at vii, xii
(2021), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2956.html.
107 See, e.g., Brennan et al., supra note 50, at 328 (noting Gilead’s returns on its
hepatitis C medications amounting to forty times the cost of producing the drugs and
three times the purchase price of Pharmasset, in less than 2.5 years).
108 See Michelle M. Mello & Trish Riley, To Address Drug Affordability, Grab the LowHanging Fruit, 325 JAMA HEALTH F. 1599, 1599 (2021); STAFF OF U.S. S. OF HOMELAND SEC.
& GOVERNMENTAL AFFS. COMM., MINORITY OFF., MANUFACTURED CRISIS: HOW DEVASTATING DRUG
PRICE INCREASES ARE HARMING AMERICA’S SENIORS, at 1–2 (2018), https://www.hsgac.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/Manufactured%20Crisis%20-%20How%20Devastating%20
Drug%20Price%20Increases%20Are%20Harming%20America’s%20Seniors%20%20Report.pdf.
109 Sarah Owermohle, Drug Prices Steadily Rise Amid Pandemic, Data Shows, POLITICO
(July 7, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/07/drug-prices-corona
virus-351729; see also STEPHEN W. SCHONDELMEYER & LEIGH PURVIS, AARP, TRENDS IN RETAIL
PRICES OF BRAND NAME PRESCRIPTION DRUGS WIDELY USED BY OLDER AMERICANS, 2006 TO 2020,
at 1 (2021) (“Between 2019 and 2020, retail prices for 260 widely used brand name
prescription drugs increased by 2.9 percent, more than two times faster than general
inflation (1.3 percent).”); Mello & Riley, supra note 108, at 1599 (noting “large price
increases continue to be a major driver of prescription drug costs.”).
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or purchasing programs. Within patent law itself, safeguards within the
Bayh-Dole Act applicable to federally funded inventions could be used
to address excessively priced patented medications,110 but in practice
have lain fallow.111 Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 1498, applicable to all patented
inventions, regardless of funding source, limits plaintiffs’ recovery for
government use of patents to reasonable compensation and does not
allow injunctions. Again, however, in recent memory government
patent use has remained largely dormant as a tool to improve drug
accessibility.112 The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act (“Hatch-Waxman Act”)113 and the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act (“BPCIA”)114 facilitate competition in
prescription drug markets, which drive down drug prices, but do not
regulate excessive pricing.
Finally, federal programs involving prescription drug coverage and
procurement (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, and the Federal Supply
Schedule) regulate, to some extent, the price of medications, including
those that are patented. On the whole, however, with limited exceptions
for regulation of certain price increases,115 these laws are generally
ineffective at counteracting overall trends, and none currently regulate
patented medications for price excessiveness. Drug manufacturers
110 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (providing the federal government with a “nonexclusive,
nontransferrable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice” (or have practiced on its
behalf) the subject invention throughout the world); 35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (empowering the
federal government to “march-in” on patent rights under certain conditions and grant a
license to others).
111 Alfred B. Engelberg & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Use the Bayh-Dole Act to Lower Drug
Prices for Government Healthcare Programs, 22 NATURE MED. 576, 576 (2016); Wolitz,
The Pay Twice Critique, supra note 86, at 183; Amy Kapczynski & Aaron S. Kesselheim,
‘Government Patent Use’: A Legal Approach to Reducing Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH AFFS.
791, 794 (2016) (noting the NIH’s aversion to exercising march-in rights and
interpreting “reasonable terms” to only refer to “product availability”); NAT’L INSTS. OF
HEALTH, OFF. OF THE DIR., IN THE CASE OF NORVIR® MANUFACTURED BY ABBOTT LAB’YS, INC. 5–6
(2004),
https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/March-InNorvir.pdf.
112 See Christopher Morten & Charles Duan, Who’s Afraid of Section 1498?: Government Patent Use as Versatile Policy Tool, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2020/04/whos-afraid-of-section-1498-government.html.
113 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.
114 Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§
7001–7003, 124 Stat. 804-21 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012)).
115 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(2)(A) (Medicaid provision limiting price increases);
Lemley, Ouellette, & Sachs, supra note 74, at 89 (noting that more than half of Medicaid
rebates are estimated to be due to a provision limiting price increases in excess of
inflation). Yet, price increases—even modest ones—on an already excessively priced
medication still leaves an excessive price paid.

WOLITZ (DO NOT DELETE)

408

11/12/21 3:38 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:385

interacting with these programs are still free to initially price their
products as they wish. Moreover, given that Medicare and Medicaid
must cover certain drugs as a matter of law, this weakens their
bargaining position.116
The Constitution empowered Congress to create a patent scheme
to incentivize novel inventions, including new medications. Yet,
Congress has done so without addressing pricing abuses. In so doing, it
has privileged private interests over the physical health of its citizens
and the financial health of both citizens and states. Its failure to act is
further contrary to the country’s democratic wishes.117 Addressing
prescription drug prices is a bipartisan priority. Eighty-five percent of
Democrats and 69 percent of Republicans ranked lowering prescription
drug prices as the most important priority for Congress and the former
administration, just behind lowering health care costs more
generally.118
Yet, patented drug prices remain largely unregulated, and a prima
facie case can be made that Americans needlessly pay more for their
medications than serves the existing ends of federal patent policy.
While rights of exclusion under conditions of scarce resources could
mean a tradeoff of access by present patients for the existence of new
therapies for future patients, drugs are necessities. Congress and the
executive branch have thus far failed to execute laws that treat this
potential tradeoff with the gravitas it deserves. They have further
privileged private interests beyond the purposes imposed by the
Constitution at the expense of states and individuals’ financial and
physical health. Despite the tragic costs imposed by this federal scheme
and the chronic, overwhelming, bipartisan consensus that drug prices
need to be addressed, the federal government has neither enacted nor
implemented meaningful reform. While Congress has again been
contemplating federal drug pricing reform,119 and one cannot predict

116 Lemley, Ouellette, & Sachs, supra note 74, at 86 (discussing Medicare Part D’s six
protected classes and the impact this can have on negotiations); id. at 88 (noting that
because all state Medicaid programs cover prescriptions, this “requires them to cover
all FDA-approved drugs with a few exceptions . . . .”).
117 See Isaac D. Buck, The Drug (Pricing) Wars: States, Preemption, and Unsustainable
Prices, 99 N.C. L. REV. 167, 215–216 (2020).
118 POLITICO AND HARVARD T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, AMERICANS’ DOMESTIC PRIORITIES
FOR PRESIDENT TRUMP AND CONGRESS IN THE MONTHS LEADING UP TO THE 2020 ELECTION 1, 3
(2020).
119 Rachel Cohrs, Moderate Democrats Sink Pelosi’s Aggressive Drug Pricing Bill in Key
Committee Vote, STAT NEWS (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/09/15/
moderate-democrats-sink-pelosis-aggressive-drug-pricing-bill-in-key-committeevote/.
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the future, presently, federal abdication continues to leave a significant
regulatory vacuum.
III. STATES AS SECOND-BEST SOLUTIONS
A. Looking Beyond the Federal Government
Given the federal nature of patents, one might reasonably expect
well-crafted solutions to problems of excessively priced patented
medications by the federal government. A national policy solution is
preferable morally, pragmatically, and doctrinally. Affordability
challenges pertaining to excessively priced patented medications are a
problem for Americans. They are not a problem just for Californians, or
Utahns, or Floridians. If regulation is motivated by a desire to stamp out
unfairness, piecemeal regulation at the sub-national level runs the
substantial risk of leaving many behind. Unfair pricing will persist for
some and not others because of the arguably morally insignificant
distinction of intranational geographic boundaries.
Likewise, for regulation justified on the basis of correcting for
inefficiencies. In the context of expensive patented medications, the
sanitized vocabulary of efficiency obscures its import: assuming price
and access are largely inversely correlated under conditions of scarce
resources, preventing the overcompensation of patent holders means
more patients will have access to important medications. Lives and
health are on the line.
Doctrinally and pragmatically, a national solution would avoid
legal challenges that, while perhaps not necessarily insurmountable,
have plagued state drug pricing reform efforts.120 The pharmaceutical
and biotechnology industries are incredibly well-resourced, organized,
and litigious. As mentioned at the outset, states do not merely need to
grapple with and litigate problems of patent preemption. They also
have to contend with the dormant Commerce Clause. Federal regulation
sidesteps these potential doctrinal impediments entirely.121 Moreover,
to the extent states struggle with budget shortfalls, the federal
government is far better placed financially to address these problems of
national significance.
Federal proposals, however, even when they exist, have
historically come up short. The United States currently does not have a
general scheme regulating drug prices, let alone excessive patented

120
121

See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26, at 862–863.
Id. at 957.
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drug prices.122 And, despite bipartisan support in Congress and an
explicit commitment by the prior Administration to address the
problem of excessively priced medications, federal solutions have been
largely stalled or ineffective. Over the past few years, the most
prominent legislative proposals for drug pricing reform have focused on
Medicare.123 Yet, these efforts in both the Senate and the House went
nowhere.124 Further, former President Trump’s Executive Orders—
which, for the most part, focused on federal programs—were generally
met with great skepticism by experts.125
Federal drug pricing reform is again a priority for President Biden
and Congress. President Biden’s recent Executive Order to Promote
Competition in the American Economy explicitly supports “aggressive

122 See, e.g., Why Does the US Pay the Highest Prices in the World for Prescription
Drugs?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Primary Health and Retirement Security of the
S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 117th Cong. 3 (2021) (statement of Aaron
S. Kesselheim, Prof. of Medicine, Harvard Medical School) (“[I]n the US we allow brandname pharmaceutical manufacturers to charge whatever they want during their periods
of government-granted market exclusivity—a condition not seen in any other developed
nation.”); S. Vincent Rajkumar, The High Cost of Prescription Drugs: Causes and Solutions,
10 BLOOD CANCER J. 1, 1 (2020) (“Unregulated monopoly over an essential product can
lead to unaffordable prices that threaten the life of citizens. This is the case in the United
States, where there are no regulations to control prescription drug prices . . . .”); Sarah
Kliff, The True Story of America’s Sky-High Prescription Drug Prices, VOX (May 10, 2018;
9:19
AM),
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2016/11/30/12945756/
prescription-drug-prices-explained (“The United States is exceptional in that it does not
regulate or negotiate the prices of new prescription drugs when they come onto
market.”).
123 See, e.g., Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act of 2019, S. 2543, 116th Cong.
(2019); Description of the Chairman’s Mark, The Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act
(PDPRA) of 2019 (as reported by S. Comm. on Finance, July 25, 2019), https://www.finance.senate.gov/download/description-of-the-chairmans-mark-for-the-prescriptiondrug-pricing-reduction-act-of-2019; Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act,
H.R. 3, 116th Cong. (as passed by the House, Dec. 12, 2019).
124 Id. H.R. 3, however, as discussed below, was reintroduced, Elijah E. Cummings
Lower Drug Costs Now Act, H.R. 3, 117th Cong., https://www.congress.gov/bill/117thcongress/house-bill/3?r=8&s=1, and a version of it was being considered through the
Biden spending plan before the House Budget Committee.
125 On July 24, 2020, President Trump issued four Executive Orders related to drug
pricing. These orders permitted drug re-importation from Canada, alterations to the
handling of discounts in Medicare Part D, passing on 340B savings to underserved
patients, and use of an international pricing index within Medicare Part B. Trump
Administration Announces Historic Action to Lower Drug Prices for Americans, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NEWS RELEASE (July 24, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/
news/2020/07/24/trump-administration-announces-historic-action-lower-drugprices-americans.html. The response to these orders was underwhelming. Sydney
Lupkin, Trump Signs Executive Orders On Drug Prices, NPR (July 24, 2020), https://
www.npr.org/2020/07/24/895290378/trump-signs-executive-orders-on-drugprices.
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legislative reforms that would lower prescription drug prices.”126 The
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Xavier Becerra, was tasked
with generating a plan to “combat excessive pricing of prescription
drugs.”127 Recently released, this plan identifies both legislative and
administrative levers for improving drug affordability, promoting
competition, and fostering scientific innovation.128
Legislative
proposals include reforms to Medicare to permit drug price negotiation
and cap out-of-pocket costs, legislation to address price increases, and
legislation to improve generic and biosimilar competition.129
Administrative reforms include testing the use of “value-based
payments in Medicare Part B,” efforts to improve transparency and
competition, and the development of drug importation programs.130
Meanwhile, Congress has been re-considering the ability of Medicare to
negotiate maximum fair prices for certain single source drugs131
enforced through the imposition of not insignificant civil monetary
penalties.132 In earlier iterations, individuals enrolled in commercial
plans could also benefit from these negotiations, unless their plans
opted out.133
The federal drug pricing reform landscape has been more dynamic
than in recent memory. But barriers to federal-level reform are
dominantly political134 and comprehensive federal level reform to
Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 9, 2021).
Id. at 36,997.
128 XAVIER BECERRA, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR
ADDRESSING HIGH DRUG PRICES 2 (2021), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/202109/Competition%20EO%2045-Day%20Drug%20Pricing%20Report%209-8-2021.pdf.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 2–3.
131 Build Back Better Act, S. Con. Res. 14, 117th Cong., at 2343 (as passed by H. Budget
Comm., 2021), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BU/BU00/20210925/114090/BILLS
-117pih-BuildBackBetterAct.pdf.
132 Id. at 2386.
133 Id. at 2383–2384.
134 Consider, for instance, that pharmaceutical industry spending on lobbying and
congressional campaign contributions is notoriously strategic and generous. Among
other examples, these dynamics were on display with the 2020 Senate races. A blue
wave across the executive branch and both houses of Congress was deemed “a
nightmare scenario for drug companies,” and their political spending therefore reflected
their “clear stake in keeping the Senate in Republican hands.” Lev Facher & Kaitlyn
Bartley, Pharma Is Showering Congress with Cash, Even as Drug Makers Race to Fight the
Coronavirus, STAT NEWS (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/feature/
prescription-politics/prescription-politics/. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell,
for instance, according to one analysis, received more drug industry campaign
contributions “than any other lawmaker”; McConnell has demonstrated little interest in
advancing drug pricing reforms. Id.; see Olivier J. Wouters, Lobbying Expenditures and
Campaign Contributions by the Pharmaceutical and Health Product Industry in the United
126
127
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address excessive patented drug pricing remains unlikely; the most
likely reform outcome, if any, is Medicare reform, but passage of even
more limited measures remains far from certain. As Rachel Sachs has
written of the HHS plan to address high drug prices, “what is needed is
not necessarily new ideas, but the legal and political ability to
implement existing proposals.”135
The specific proposal for Medicare negotiation has been
contentious with “three key democrats” announcing earlier this fall that
they would not vote in its favor.136 Given background politics, it was
speculated that these no votes would likely “put drug-pricing reform in
mortal jeopardy” and threaten President Biden’s overarching spending
plan, which these reforms would help finance.137 Aaron Kesselheim and
Jerry Avorn opined that these democrats’ opposition to drug pricing
reform “is probably explained by the scale of pharmaceutical spending
to block reform.”138
The situation surrounding President Biden’s spending package is
highly fluid. The White House had announced that the spending package
would move forward without any drug pricing reform provisions.139
Despite the President spending “countless hours with members of
Congress,” there was not enough support for government drug price
negotiation—”every single policy idea aimed at lowering prescription
drug prices” was going to be “abandon[ed].”140
As of this writing, however, it appears that a revised drug pricing
deal is again under consideration.141 This compromise currently
includes an out-of-pocket cap for Medicare Part D beneficiaries, a
restructuring of Part D’s catastrophic coverage phase, Medicare Part B
and Part D drug manufacturer rebates to the government for drug price

States, 1999-2018, 180 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 688, 688 (2020) (but also noting siginificant
state-level contributions).
135 Rachel Sachs, Biden Drug Pricing Plan Seeks To Balance Access and Innovation,
HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20210909.434045/full/.
136 Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Letting the Government Negotiate Drug Prices
Won’t Hurt Innovation, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
outlook/2021/09/22/drug-pricing-negotiation-biden-bill/.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Rachel Cohrs, Biden Abandons His Push to Lower Drug Prices, STAT NEWS (Oct. 28,
2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/10/28/biden-abandons-his-push-to-lowerdrug-prices/.
140 Id.
141 Rachel Sachs, Understanding The New Drug Price Reform Deal, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG
(Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20211104.184553/
full/.
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increases in excess of inflation (which would impact private insurers as
well), and authority (scaled back relative to previous proposals) for
direct Medicare drug price negotiation.142 Under this deal, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services would only be permitted to negotiate the
prices of up to ten drugs in the program’s first year and a maximum of
twenty drugs in the future.143 Negotiated prices further would not be
operative until an initial post-approval market period had passed.144
Reactions to this draft compromise have, on the one hand, noted its
significance relative to the status quo,145 and, on the other hand,
observed that it “‘seems designed to let legislators claim an achievement
while granting pharma protection.’”146 It remains to be seen what the
final text will be as well as whether these compromise Medicare reforms
ultimately become law.
Against a background of continued federal gridlock, uncertainty,
and proposals predominantly targeting specific federal programs, a
search for “second-best solutions” is compelling. A second-best
solution, as the phrase is used here, represents a policy that might be
non-ideal in some respects, yet in light of real-world imperfections is the
most desirable of available options to achieve a policy goal.147 This
Article argues that we can look to state level excessive pricing regulation
for the who and how of a second-best solution to the problem of
excessively priced patented prescription medications. Further, as even
this second-best solution faces doctrinal and pragmatic barriers on the
basis of patent preemption precedent, a second-second best solution—
payment regulation or payment regulation in tandem with penalties on
excessive price increases—should be considered.
Regarding the who of a second-best solution, a national solution is
not our only option for addressing the unfairness and inefficiency of
excessively priced patented medications. States offer an alternative.
Id.
Id. Build Back Better Act, H.R. 5376, 117th Cong. § 1192(a) (as reported by the H.
Budget Comm., with modifications, Nov. 3, 2021).
144 Sachs, supra note 141; Build Back Better Act, H.R. 5376, 117th Cong. §
1192(e)(1)(A)–(B) (as reported by the H. Budget Comm., with modifications, Nov. 3,
2021).
145 Sachs, supra note 141.
146 Bob Herman, Pharmaceutical Industry May Avoid Big Losses in Drug Pricing Deal
(Nov. 3, 2021) (quoting Ronny Gal, Bernstein pharmaceutical analyst), https://www.axios.com/pharmaceutical-industry-may-avoid-big-losses-in-drug-pricing-dealbea3ada1-30b7-412b-b094-b9d6a950934f.html.
147 Cf. Robert E. Goodin, Political Ideals and Political Practice, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 37, 52
(1995) (explaining the economic theory of second best where a “second-best state of
affairs is not necessarily one in which your ideal conditions are realized more rather
than less completely”).
142
143
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For the reasons discussed above, however, state-level intervention to
curb excessive patented drug pricing is less preferable to federal reform.
In virtue of their jurisdictional limitations, state reform efforts will be
necessarily geographically constrained to particular populations.
Further, the legal maneuvers available to states are more restricted;
they must navigate regulating in the shadow of avoiding preemption,
which can impose additional limitations on the reach of reforms. Thus,
if the achievement of a particular health policy outcome—widespread
fairer and more efficient prices for patented medications for all
Americans—is the goal, states as the implementers of reform face
inherent limitations that the federal government does not.
Yet, in the world of second-best scenarios, reformers who operate
with additional constraints appear preferable to a lack of reformers at
all. States have been experimenting with a number of different
proposals to address excessive pricing, to control costs, and to improve
the affordability of prescription medications for their constituents. In
contrast to the federal government, states are both motivated to
implement drug pricing reform and, perhaps more importantly, have
the demonstrated political ability to pass a variety of new legislation.148
States stepping into the role of excessive patented drug price
reformers, because the federal government has been politically
incapacitated, further offers the prospect of ancillary benefits by way of
values traditionally associated with federalism. While state drug pricing
reform largely appears motivated by ideals of instrumental
federalism—that is, federalism in the service of a particular policy
goal—some state efforts do exude qualities consistent with “federalism
for federalism’s own sake.”149 These qualities include increased
accountability to constituents, experimentation, and expression of local
preferences and values.150 For instance, in the adjacent arena of drug
pricing transparency legislation, Nevada’s new laws focus specifically
on medicines for health conditions of particular salience to the state—
diabetes and asthma.151 In the present context, state regulation
involving determinations of excessive pricing schemes exemplifies local
experimentation with difficult moral and policy considerations
regarding unfair and excessive drug pricing.
148 See, e.g., Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26, at 873–87 (discussing state-level price
gouging and rate-setting laws).
149 See Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, 70
STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1787 (2018) (drawing distinction between valuing federalism as a
means to an end as opposed to an end in itself).
150 Id.
151 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 439B.630, 439B.635, 439B.640, 439B.645, 439B.650 (West
2021).
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That states—subject to avoiding or overcoming preemption
headwinds—can be excessive patented drug pricing reformers does not
yet address the issue of how such a second-best solution might be
implemented. To answer this question, two primary kinds of policy
tools are available: price regulation and payment regulation. Price
regulation sets the prices that drug manufacturers (or, perhaps
additionally, others within the supply chain) can charge for the sale of
patented prescription medications.152 Payment regulation, by contrast,
regulates the amount that payors or purchasers can pay for patented
prescription medications.153 It does not restrict how much a drug
manufacturer can charge. The former type of regulation focuses on
seller conduct, the latter on buyer conduct.
Price regulation and payment regulation tackle the problem of
excessively priced medications from different angles, but could yield
similar results. Suppose, for instance, a drug ought to be priced at $100.
A state, conceivably, can achieve a $100 purchase price either through
prohibiting a drug manufacturer from charging in excess of $100 for the
drug or by prohibiting reimbursement for the drug in excess of $100.
While price and payment regulation could theoretically achieve
similar results, there are moral and political reasons to favor price
regulation.154 From a moral perspective, the primary aim of government
regulation in this space is to prohibit unfair and excessive patented drug
pricing. This is exactly what price regulation does. It identifies the
problematic conduct and directly prohibits the responsible actor from
treating others in morally problematic ways. It prevents patent holders
from charging unfair prices and charging more than necessary in
furtherance of the goals of federal patent law. Payment regulation, by
contrast, does not prohibit unfair or problematic conduct; drug
manufacturers remain free to price their drugs unfairly and excessively.
Payment regulation puts the onus of preventing unfair or excessive
pricing on those who would be overcharged, and its protective value

See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26, at 948.
Id.
154 See Govind Persad, Pricing Drugs Fairly, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 929, 973–977
(2021) (arguing in favor of price regulation). Considerations of ERISA preemption could
offer an additional reason to prefer price regulation. Payment regulatory schemes
designed to avoid ERISA preemption could be of more limited reach than a comparative
price regulation. See, e.g., Rachel E. Sachs, The National Academy for State Health Policy’s
Proposal for State-Based International Reference Pricing for Prescription Drugs, NAT’L
ACAD. FOR ST. HEALTH POL’Y (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.nashp.org/the-nationalacademy-for-state-health-policys-proposal-for-state-based-international-referencepricing-for-prescription-drugs/#toggle-id-3 (discussing ERISA complications with
upper payment limits incorporating international reference pricing).
152
153
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extends only to buyers covered by the law. It makes drug manufacturer
participation in non-excessive and fair pricing voluntary.
Political reasons also suggest a preference for price regulation over
payment regulation. Price regulation reflects the true conflict at issue
regarding excessively priced patented medications as one between
patients and payors on the one hand and drug manufacturers on the
other. Payment regulation reframes the terms of the debate in an
unhelpful way.155 The debate about access and expensive medications
becomes a conflict between patients and payors.156 It refocuses the
debate from excessive and unfair pricing to potentially ungenerous
spending. Payment regulation poses the political problem of potentially
restricting access to drugs already in use by beneficiaries if drug
manufacturers are not willing participants.157
As one example of how this reframing can alter the terms of the
debate, consider the plight of parents whose toddlers suffer from the
debilitating, if not fatal, genetic disorder of spinal muscular atrophy.
Novartis’ Zolgensma has been hailed as a miracle drug.158 It requires
just a single infusion to be administered before a patient reaches her
second birthday and can be potentially curative.159 The drug’s price,
however, is $2.1 million which has led to highly publicized battles
between parents and insurers, with many patients being, at least prior
to public shaming campaigns, denied coverage for the drug.160 As
parents observe, it is not feasible to find a job with different insurance
or to come up with the $2.1 million themselves. Yet, one has to wonder:
why must this drug be so expensive?161 News coverage has appeared to

See Persad, supra note 154, at 976.
Id.
157 Id.
158 Linda Carroll & Lauren Dunn, $2.1 Million Drug to Treat Rare Genetic Disease
Approved by FDA, NBC (May 24, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/healthnews/2-1-million-drug-treat-rare-genetic-disease-approved-fda-n1009956; Shraddha
Chakradhar, ‘Maisie’s Army’: How a Grassroots Group is Mobilizing to Help Toddlers Access
a Lifesaving Drug, STAT NEWS (August 20, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/
08/20/maisies-army-zolgensma-access-spinal-muscular-atrophy/; Emma Court, ‘Like
We Were Being Forced to Gamble With Our Son’s Life’: Health Insurers Won’t Pay for a
$2.1 Million Drug for Kids, and Parents Say They’re Running Out of Time, BUSINESS INSIDER
(July 26, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/health-insurance-companies-denykids-with-sma-gene-therapy-zolgensma-2019-7.
159 See, e.g., Court, supra note 158.
160 Id.
161 The company defended the price on the basis of the drug’s value relative to the
estimated $6 million in long-term care costs that would otherwise be spent during the
first ten years of these children’s lives. See Faith Karimi, She’s 14 Months Old and Needs
a Drug that Costs $2.1 Million to Save Her Life, CNN (Mar. 31, 2021), https://
155
156
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focus on challenges between patients and insurers as opposed to this
underlying question.162
While there are moral and political reasons to favor state level
price regulation over state level payment regulation, a key feature of
second-best solutions is that they must offer pragmatic and workable
policy options.163 A pressing question, therefore, is can states even
serve as our second-best solution when it comes to excessively priced
patented medications? What reforms are states exploring?
B. State Experimentation: Price and Payment Regulation
1. Price Regulation of Patented Medications
States, in general, regulate the prices of goods in a variety of
ways.164 To date, the District of Columbia’s (“D.C.”) Prescription Drug
Excessive Pricing Act of 2005 (“the Act”)165 offers the most prominent
example of an enacted excessive price statute that specifically targeted
patented drug prices.166 The Act begins by finding that excessive drug
prices were “threatening the health and welfare of residents of the
District” and that “[t]he traditional police powers of the District of
Columbia include protecting and promoting the health, safety, and
welfare of its residents . . . .”167
In light of these findings, the Act therefore made it “unlawful” for
drug manufacturers and licensees “to sell or supply for sale” any
patented prescription medications for an excessive price within D.C.168
Though the Act did not define “excessive,” it created a rebuttable
presumption of excessiveness for wholesale prices 30 percent or
greater than those medications’ prices in certain high-income countries:
“A prima facie case of excessive pricing shall be established where the
wholesale price of a patented prescription drug in the District is over
30% higher than the comparable price in any high income country in

www.cnn.com/2021/03/31/health/toddler-expensive-drug-zolgensma-wellness/index.html.
162 Id.
163 Cf. Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26, at 864 (discussing five commonsense
assumptions of workable excessive price regulation).
164 Id. at 859.
165 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-4551-28-4555.
166 For purposes of preemption principles, the District of Columbia was treated as a
state in litigation. Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
167 D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4551 (West 2021).
168 Id. § 28-4553.
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which the product is protected by patents or other exclusive marketing
rights.”169
“High income county” was specifically defined to refer to the United
Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Australia.170
As a rebuttable
presumption, a defendant could try to justify its “excessive” prices.171 To
rebut the prima facie case of excessiveness, defendant drug
manufacturers or licensees would need to demonstrate that the price
was not excessive in light of the drug’s costs of invention, development,
and production; the company’s global profits; any government support
for the drug’s development; and the price’s impact on access to the
drug.172 The Act was broad both in terms of who could sue to enforce
the Act’s provisions and the range of available remedies.173
The two major industry trade organizations—Biotechnology
Industry Organization (“BIO”) and Pharmaceutical Researchers and
Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”)—sued alleging, among other
claims, patent preemption.174 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit ruled that
the D.C.’s Act was conflict preempted on the basis of federal patent law
in the case of BIO v. D.C.175 As this ruling is of great practical importance
for states in crafting their policy interventions impacting excessively
priced patented medications, its discussion and analysis are reserved
for a detailed discussion below.
This adverse ruling regarding patent preemption, however, has
inspired states over the years to shift their focus in drafting excessive
pricing laws to generics and inspired increased interest in payment
regulation.176 Among anti-price gouging proposals in the 2021
legislative session, a focus on generics predominates.177 States,
however, over the past few years have still put forward proposed
legislation with the ability to reach patented medications.
Minnesota’s HF 4 provides an example.178 This bill prohibited the
unconscionable price gouging of “essential prescription drugs sold in
Id. § 28-4554(a).
Id. § 28-4552 (2).
171 Id. § 28-4554(b).
172 Id.
173 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4555.
174 Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
175 Id. at 1374.
176 Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26, at 877.
177 See 2021 State Legislative Action to Lower Pharmaceutical Costs Tracker, NAT’L
ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y, https://www.nashp.org/rx-legislative-tracker/ (see “Price
Gouging” tab) (last visited Oct. 28, 2021).
178 See generally H.R. 4, 2020 Leg., 91st Sess. (Minn. 2020).
169
170
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Minnesota” by drug manufacturers or wholesalers.179 Finding that
essential prescription drugs are necessities, the bill stated:
Abuses in the pricing of various essential prescription drugs
are well-documented, jeopardize the health and welfare of the
public, and have caused the death of patients who could not
afford to pay an unconscionable price for these drugs. . . . This
section is intended to address such abuses, but allow drug
manufacturers and wholesale drug distributors a fair rate of
return with respect to their sale of essential prescription
drugs in the state of Minnesota.180
Crucially, among other conditions, the bill defined an essential
prescription drug to be “a patented (including an exclusivity-protected
drug), off-patent, or generic drug . . . .”181 The bill targeted medications
that have a wholesale acquisition cost of greater than $80 per month or
per treatment and defined an “unconscionable” price by reference to a
drug’s costs.182 An unconscionable price is one that “is not reasonably
justified by the actual cost of inventing, producing, selling, and
distributing the essential prescription drug, and any actual cost of an
appropriate expansion of access to the drug to promote public health
. . . .”183 This legislation further required that the Attorney-General be
notified of “any price increase of 15 percent or more” for any essential
drug sold in Minnesota.184
Other recent price gouging bills that reach patented medications
have narrower applications. For instance, a New York bill sought to
focus exclusively on price increases above the cost of living for “critical
prescription drugs,” defined as those drugs that are “necessary to
prevent or treat a disease or state in which death is possible or
imminent.”185 By contrast, a bill in New Jersey focused exclusively on
“prohibit[ing] any person from charging excessive prices for drugs
developed by publicly funded research.”186 Excessive pricing is
determined by reference to the lowest price charged in certain foreign
jurisdictions.187 Still other excessive drug pricing bills have limited their
reach to times of emergency and market shortages. A bill in Rhode
Island, for instance, would reach patented medications sold for an
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

Id. § 4, subdiv. 1.
Id.
Id. § 4, subdiv. 2(b).
Id. § 4, subdiv. 2(b)(2)(i).
Id. § 4, subdiv. 2(d)(1).
Id. § 4, subdiv. 5.
S. 320, 2020–2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 346(a), (f) (N.Y. 2021).
Assemb. B. 2671, 219th Leg. Sess. (N.J. 2020).
Id.
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“unreasonably excessive” price during an emergency.188
An
“unreasonably excessive” price, however, is defined by reference to the
price of the drug thirty days prior to the declaration of an emergency.189
States have further begun to experiment with an adjacent approach
that—rather than regulate drug prices directly—levies a fine or tax
penalty on state revenue generated from unsupported or excessive
price increases taken on a drug.190 These proposals operate by selecting
a baseline reference price (for instance, keyed to a particular calendar
date or launch date), but if a drug manufacturer subsequently decides
to increase prices, increases deemed “unsupported” or “excessive”
would be subject to a penalty.191 Existing proposals reach patented
medications.
Massachusetts Bill H.1, the Governor’s proposed budget, for
instance, included provisions applicable to any FDA approved drug.192
Under these provisions, drug manufacturers would have to pay a
penalty equal to 80 percent of that portion of a price increase deemed
excessive per unit “of the drug ultimately dispensed or administered in
the commonwealth.”193 Excessive price increases are determined by
starting with the reference price of the drug which is defined to be the
wholesale acquisition cost (“WAC”) of the drug, per unit, as of January 1,
2021, or if a drug was not yet on the market, the date it was first
marketed.194
Using this reference price as a baseline, drug
manufacturers are permitted to increase a drug’s price by the consumer
price index plus an additional 2 percent of the reference price
annually.195 Price increases beyond this are deemed excessive, and drug

188 See H.R. 7040, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. 6-13.4-3 (2) (R.I. 2020) (defining
“Drug”).
189 Id. at 6-13.4-3(6).
190 See 2021 State Legislative Action to Lower Pharmaceutical Costs, NAT’L ACAD. FOR
STATE HEALTH POL’Y, https://www.nashp.org/rx-legislative-tracker/ (noting five
unsupported price hike bills) (last visited Oct. 28, 2021).
191 These proposals have features in common with payment regulation insofar as
they permit a drug manufacturer to charge whatever it wants. Unlike payment
regulation, however, unsupported price increase legislation regulates not what payers
can pay, but how much sellers can increase their prices without consequence. See Mello
& Dusetzina, infra note 390; NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y, Q&A: An Act to Protect
Consumers from Unsupported Prescription Drug Price Increases (July 28, 2020),
https://www.nashp.org/qa-an-act-to-protect-consumers-from-unsupported-priceincreases-on-prescription-drugs/.
192 B.H.1, 192nd Gen. Ct., § 28 ch. 63E(1) (Mass. 2021).
193 Id. § 28 ch. 63E(2(a)).
194 Id. § 28 ch. 63E(1).
195 Id.
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manufacturers must file a return with the Commissioner of Revenue
paying the 80 percent per unit excessive price increase tax penalty.196
2. Payment Regulation: Out of Pocket Caps and Drug
Affordability Review Boards
Rather than regulate patented drug prices for excessiveness,
payment regulation offers an alternative. One recent permutation of
payment reform is out-of-pocket caps for patients taking insulin. U.S.
prices for insulin have been a particularly fraught subject in
controversies over drug pricing. Insulin prices have risen dramatically;
the same $1,487 vial of insulin in 2019 might have only cost $175.57
fifteen years earlier.197 Between 2012 and 2016, prices nearly
doubled.198 Patients can end up paying thousands of dollars for this
necessary medication even with insurance.199 There have been
numerous examples of patients rationing their medications, with some
losing their lives as a result.200 Consequently, Colorado became the first
state to pass legislation limiting insulin co-pays to no more than $100
per month for state-regulated health plans.201 Several other states have
recently passed similar legislation.202 Importantly, the legislation does
not limit what drug manufacturers can charge insurers. Rather, it limits
patients’ cost-sharing with their insurers, and raises the possibility that
insurers can pass on such costs by raising premiums.
The National Academy for State Health Policy (“NASHP”) has
advocated for a different approach to payment regulation. It provided
model legislation for Drug Affordability Review Boards (“DABs”) that
Id. §§ 28 Ch. 63E(1–2).
Nicholas Florko, ‘Everyone Is at Fault’: With Insulin Prices Skyrocketing, There’s
Plenty of Blame to Go Around, STAT NEWS (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/
2019/02/19/no-generic-insulin-who-is-to-blame/.
198 Ed Silverman, Insulin Costs for U.S. Patients Nearly Doubled from 2012 Through
2016, but Usage Was Flat, STAT NEWS (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2019/01/22/insulin-drug-prices-diabetes/.
199 See Anna Staver, Colorado Becomes First State in Nation to Cap Price of Insulin,
DENVER POST (May 23, 2019), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/05/23/colorado-insulin-price-cap/.
200 Amy Martyn, States Are Trying to Cap the Price of Insulin. Pharmaceutical
Companies Are Pushing Back., NBC NEWS (Aug. 15, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/states-are-trying-cap-price-insulin-pharmaceutical-companies-arepushing-n1236766.
201 Meg Wingerter, Lawmaker Looks to Close “Loophole” in Colorado’s First-in-theNation Insulin Price Cap, DENVER POST (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.denverpost.com/
2020/01/10/colorado-insulin-price-cap-loophole/.
202 See Nicholas Florko, State Legislatures Are Lapping the Federal Government On
Drug-Pricing—Even Amid The Coronavirus, STAT NEWS (April 14, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/14/states-drug-pricing-policies/.
196
197
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has informed many state proposals.203 The basic idea is that a
government body is endowed with the authority to set payment ceilings
for specified payers within a state regarding particular drugs that are
deemed excessively priced or pose affordability challenges.
Maryland’s passage of HB 768 is perhaps the most high-profile
example of this idea’s realization.204 In 2019, Maryland created its
Prescription Drug Affordability Board (“Board”) with the purpose “to
protect State residents, State and local governments, commercial health
plans, health care providers, pharmacies licensed in the State, and other
stakeholders within the health care system from the high costs of
prescription drug products.”205 Comprised of members with expertise
in medicine and health economics,206 the Board is charged with
identifying prescription drugs that pose affordability challenges.207 For
brand drugs and biologics, these are drugs that launch with a WAC of
greater or equal to $30,000 annually or per course of treatment; or
drugs that have a WAC increase of greater or equal to $3,000 annually
or per course of treatment, if shorter.208 The Board will also identify
biosimilars that are not at least 15 percent cheaper than the referenced
biologic at launch, and generic drugs that are $100 or more meeting
certain criteria.209 A catchall clause permits the identification of any
“other prescription drug[s] that may create affordability challenges.”210
After identifying drugs that may be unaffordable, the Board
determines which drugs merit a cost review.211 In conducting a cost
review, the Board considers many factors. For instance, it considers the
cost of the drug to health plans, the price of competitors (if any), average
concessions made to health plans, and the impact on patient access due
to cost, among other factors.212 Its lens is affordability for state payers
and patient out-of-pocket costs.213 It is only after consideration of these
factors, if the Board cannot determine whether the drug has or will

203 See Nat’l Acad. for State Health Pol’y, supra note 177 (showing sixteen
affordability review proposals as of October 14, 2021, for 2021 state legislation); for
more details on DABs see Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26, at 883–888, 948–950.
204 Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26, at 883–84.
205 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 21-2C-02(b).
206 Id. § 21-2C-03(a)(1).
207 Id. § 21-2C-08(b)(2).
208 Id. § 21-2C-08(c)(1).
209 Id. § 21-2C-08(c)(2)-(3).
210 Id. § 21-2C-08(c)(4).
211 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 21-2C-09.
212 Id. § 21-2C-09(b)(2).
213 Id. § 21-2C-09(b); see also Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26.
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create affordability challenges, that the Board may consider certain drug
manufacturer financial information, such as R&D costs.214
The Board is currently tasked with creating a report on its findings
and recommendations regarding whether setting upper payment limits
on drugs posing affordability challenges is in the state’s best interests.215
If the Board thinks the state ought to move forward, it shall draft a plan
for implementation.216 It is not until January 1, 2022, at the earliest—
and subject to plan approval—that the Board may set upper payment
limits for drugs posing affordability challenges.217 These limits would
apply to state and local plans and purchasers.218 By December 1, 2023,
the Board must then report to specified legislative committees whether
it recommends expanding the Board’s authority to set upper payment
limits for all payors.219
Given that the implementation of upper payment limits is yet to
occur, Maryland has not experienced litigation over its Prescription
Drug Affordability Board. The Board, however, hit an unexpected
speedbump. In May 2020, the legislature passed a bill authorizing
funding for the Board through fee collection from drug manufacturers,
pharmacy benefit managers, insurers, and wholesale distributers not to
exceed $2,000,000 annually.220 Yet Governor Hogan vetoed the bill,
calling it “unconscionable” to “raise taxes and fees on Marylanders at a
time when many are already out of work and financially struggling.”221
In light of previous appropriations, the Board was able to continue with
its work,222 but a lack of sustained funding would undermine its ability
to achieve its objectives. In February 2021, the Maryland House of
Delegates voted to override the Governor’s veto—a testament to the
state’s commitment to address drug pricing.223
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 21-2C-09(b)(3).
Id. § 21-2C-07, -13.
216 Id. § 21-2C-13(a).
217 Id. § 21-2C-14(a).
218 Id.
219 Id. § 21-2C-16.
220 S.B. 669, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2020), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/
2020RS/bills/sb/sb0669T.pdf.
221 Letter from Governor Hogan, Maryland Off. of the Governor, to Hon. Bill Ferguson
& Hon. Adrienne A. Jones, Maryland State House, (May 7, 2020), https://governor.maryland.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Taxes-Fees-Veto.pdf.
222 Ed Silverman, Maryland Governor Vetoes Funding for a Prescription Drug
Affordability Board, STAT NEWS (May 8, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/
2020/05/08/maryland-governor-vetoes-funding-for-a-prescription-drug-affordability-board/ (noting $750,000 in previous appropriations).
223 Ed Silverman, With a Legislative Vote, Maryland’s Prescription Drug Affordability
Board Moves Forward, STAT NEWS (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2021/02/11/maryland-drug-prices-veto-hogan/.
214
215
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Drug payment regulation reform is also occurring within Medicaid.
Medicaid is a federal-state program that receives significant rebates and
supplemental rebates from drug manufacturers. Nevertheless, state
Medicaid programs have found that the cost of prescription drugs—
particularly new specialty drugs—have become increasingly
unsustainable. Paying for prescription medications has become an
increasing share of overall state Medicaid expenditures.224 Thus, as with
non-Medicaid state proposals for DABs, a main motivation for payment
reform is to control excessive costs.
Though trends change, an interesting historical feature of some
state experimentation with Medicaid reform is the comparative
emphasis in DABs on “value-based pricing” when contrasted with nonMedicaid DAB cousins.225 The meaning of value-based pricing is
notoriously variable.226 The basic distinguishing idea, however, is that
drugs should be renumerated on the basis of their benefits and harms.
It is an approach to fair drug pricing that focuses on value for money.
Themes of value-based pricing are working their way into state
Medicaid reform in at least two ways. First, consideration of a drug’s
value is being incorporated into new DAB structures in New York and
Massachusetts as the basis for negotiating increased supplemental
rebates on high-cost drugs.227 Second, several states—with Oklahoma
being the first—have amended their state plans or received waivers to
incorporate “[v]alue-based purchasing agreements” to lower costs on
the front end through negotiation.228

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 280(1) (McKinney 2020).
Of course, one cannot draw a bright line. Non-Medicaid DABs can incorporate this
approach. Maryland’s DAB law, for instance, includes consideration of “relative financial
impacts to health…compared to baseline effects of existing therapeutic alternatives” as
well as “any other factors as determined by the Board….” MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§
21-2C-09 (b)(2)(ix), (xi).
226 Anna Kaltenboeck & Peter B. Bach, Value-Based Pricing for Drugs: Theme and
Variations, 319 JAMA 2165, 2165 (2018).
227 Thomas J. Hwang, Aaron S. Kesselheim & Ameet Sarpatwari, Value-Based Pricing
and State Reform of Prescription Drug Costs, 318 JAMA 609, 609 (2017); Priyanka Dayal
McCluskey, Pharmaceutical Industry Mounts Opposition to State’s Effort to Curb Drug
Costs, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2019/12/
23/pharmaceutical-industry-mounts-opposition-state-effort-curb-drug-costs/OlQAjYYeiJ7v5Zv7vkGbiN/story.html.
228 John Armstrong & Colleen Becker, Value-Based Pricing to Address Drug Costs, NAT’L
CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/valuebased-pricing-to-address-drug-costs.aspx.
224
225
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C. Patent Preemption and State Excessive Price Regulation
Moral and political reasons warrant a preference for state-level
price regulation over payment regulation, yet a second-best solution
must be pragmatic and workable. State excessive price regulation of
patented medications faces several practical challenges.
Most
significantly, excessive price regulation confronts the doctrinal barrier
of unfavorable Federal Circuit precedent in BIO v. D.C. As already noted,
this case ruled that at least one version of an excessive drug pricing
statute was patent preempted. This precedent is flawed, and arguments
in support of the District of Columbia, and state level excessive price
regulation more generally, ought to be revived and revisited.229 The
alternative is rather bleak: federal regulatory failure compounded by
neutered state regulation.
Preemption of state law can take different pathways.230
Preemption can be express. This occurs when federal law explicitly
preempts state law.231 Neither the Intellectual Property Clause nor
federal statutory patent law expressly preempt state law.232 Indeed, the
Federal Circuit acknowledged that “[t]here is no express provision in
the patent statute that prohibits states from regulating the price of
patented goods.”233
Yet, if not express, preemption can be implied. There are several
different kinds of implied preemption.234 Obstacle preemption—a kind
of conflict preemption—occurs when a state law “stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives

229 Sarnoff, supra note 45, at 35; Brief for the Nat’l Legis. Ass’n on Prescription Drug
Prices et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant., Biotechnology Indus.
Org. v. District of Columbia 496 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007), (No. 2006-1593), 2006 WL
3846637 (submitted by Professors Sean Fiil-Flynn and Joshua Sarnoff).
230 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480 (2018) (noting
three types of preemption).
231 The Copyright Act, for instance, has an express preemption provision. See 17
U.S.C. § 301.
232 Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s Preemptive Effect, in INTELL.
PROP. & COMMON L. 265 (Shram Rrishna Balganesh ed., 2013); Camilla A. Hrdy, State
Patents as a Solution to Underinvestment in Innovation, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 487, 525–26
(2013); Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: Returning to First Principles of
Intellectual Property Law to Determine the Issue of Federal Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 299, 335 (2008).
233 Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
234 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190, 203–04 (1983); see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480; Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142, (1963).
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of Congress.”235 Obstacle preemption is the kind of conflict preemption
that the Federal Circuit found in BIO v. D.C.236
The district court in this litigation agreed with the trade
associations’ argument that the federal patent laws, and in particular,
the Hatch-Waxman Act, “reflect Congress’ considered judgment of the
economic incentives and protections necessary to best promote the
development of new medications.”237 The D.C. Act, according to the
court, therefore impermissibly interfered with Congress’s considered
incentive scheme. The district court wrote:
How then does the D.C. Act’s thinly veiled effort to force
manufacturers to limit the wholesale price of those drugs to
less than 30% more than the wholesale price of the same
patented drugs sold in four designated “high income”
countries square with the congressional purpose and
objectives inherent in the Patent Term Restoration Act? It
doesn’t!238
The district court further observed that drug manufacturers would be
“caught between a rock and a hard place.”239 If manufacturers wanted
to continue selling their patented products in D.C. without being tied up
in litigation over what counts as excessive, they would need to price to
avoid triggering the rebuttable presumption. This was described by the
court as both a punishment and antithetical to Congress’s intentions. 240
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. According to the
appellate court, patent rights are valuable “because the ability to
foreclose competitors . . . may allow . . . an opportunity to obtain abovemarket profits during the patent’s term.”241 Moreover, the court argued
that this prospect of above-market profits plays a “central role” in patent

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
For those wondering about field preemption—when the federal regulatory
scheme is so pervasive as to infer that Congress left no room for state regulation—it is
unlikely in this context. Field preemption is a “rarer form” of preemption. Elizabeth Y.
McCuskey, Body of Preemption: Health Law Traditions and the Presumption Against
Preemption, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 95, 103 (2016). Further, as others observe, it is not “likely
that field preemption exists” in the case of patents and price regulation. Feldman et al.,
supra note 45, at 45; see also Christopher Lea Lockwood, Biotechnology Industry
Organization v. District of Columbia: A Preemptive Strike Against State Price Restrictions
on Prescription Pharmaceuticals, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 143, 178–79 (2009).
237 Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. District of Columbia, 406 F. Supp. 2d 56, 65 (D.D.C.
2005), aff’d sub nom. Biotechnology Indus. Org., 496 F.3d at 1362.
238 Id. at 66.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 66–67.
241 Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
235
236
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law’s scheme to encourage invention,242 and is of particular importance
for medications. As evidence, the court cited approvingly to part of the
Hatch-Waxman Act’s legislative history stating that profits are higher in
the absence of competition, and “‘[t]hese profits act as incentives for
innovative activities.’”243 In the court’s view, the only restriction on
economic rewards offered by a patent ought to be “the dictates of the
marketplace.”244
While the Federal Circuit recognized a “dialectic tension” between
patent rights and patient needs and state budgets, it explained that such
hardships are balanced by the limited duration of patent rights—over
which Congress has exclusive authority.245
“Congress, as the
promulgator of patent policy,” is the final arbiter of how that balance
between exclusive rights and the public domain is struck.246 In light of
this authority and Congress’s purportedly explicit consideration of
these issues in the Hatch-Waxman Act, the court deemed D.C.’s law to
impermissibly alter this balance.247 The Act penalized manufacturers,
“limiting the full exercise of the exclusionary power that derives from a
patent” and “shift[ing] the benefits of a patented invention from
inventors to consumers.”248 Furthermore, the court stated that D.C.’s
law was problematic in part because, by singling out just patented
medications for excessive price regulation, it was “in no way general.”249
In the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc, Judge Dyk and
Judge Gajarsa, the latter being the author of the underlying ruling, had a
spirited exchange.250 Judge Dyk, dissenting from the denial of rehearing,
argued that, far from “determin[ing] what price is necessary to spur
innovation” (which he thinks would be preempted),251 the Act actually
regulates price discrimination.252 Regulating for pricing parity
“presents no conflict with the purpose of the federal patent law.”253
Patents confer only an exclusive right and are not “designed . . . to allow
Id. at 1373.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 17 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,
2650).
244 Id. at 1372 (citing King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
245 Id. at 1373.
246 Id. at 1373.
247 Biotechnology Indus. Org., 496 F.3d at 1374.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 1373.
250 Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 505 F.3d 1343, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
251 Id. at 1348–49 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
252 Id. at 1349.
253 Id.
242
243
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the patent holder to exploit the grant for the maximum profit that the
market will bear.”254 Patents do not confer antitrust immunity, do not
prevent the regulation of patented products, and thus if a state law does
not interfere with the grant of exclusivity—which price discrimination
regulation does not—it does not conflict.255 Judge Dyk further noted
that the panel, in his opinion, did not give adequate attention to state
police powers.256
In response, Judge Gajarsa’s concurrence accused the dissent of
“sophistry.”257 Whatever the purported purpose of the Act, it “was a
direct attempt ‘to change federal patent policy’ within the District of
Columbia.”258 Judge Gajarsa reasoned that while patents do not provide
affirmative rights, a right of exclusion “is not granted in a vacuum or for
its own sake.”259 Exclusionary rights are instrumental and fulfill their
Constitutional purpose to promote innovation through the opportunity
for above-market profits.260 According to Judge Gajarsa, the HatchWaxman Act underscored the particular importance of these rights for
medications by restoring patent terms in light of the FDA approval
process.261 Moreover, he argued, because the Hatch-Waxman Act
facilitates competitive markets upon patent expiration due to concern
for medications’ costs, Congress clearly identified how it thinks the
balance between innovation and access should be set.262
Thus, according to Judge Gajarsa, states need to stay in their lane.
States exceed their power not just by direct interference with an
exclusive right (e.g., interfering with a patent holder’s ability to prevent
others from using or selling a patented product), but by interfering with
the anticipated rewards derived from an exclusionary right. Since the
value of an exclusionary right is its prospect of above-market rewards,
and the prospect of above-market rewards is Congress’s mechanism for
promoting innovation, this purpose is “obstructed . . . by systematically
preventing a patentee from reaping the increased profits that would
otherwise come from its exclusionary rights.”263

Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1350–51.
256 Biotechnology Indus. Org., 505 F.3d at 1351 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
257 Id. at 1344–45 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
258 Id. (quoting Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1374
(Fed. Cir. 2007)).
259 Id. at 1346.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Biotechnology Indus. Org., 505 F.3d at 1347 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
263 Id. at 1346 (footnote omitted).
254
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For all that, however, Judge Gajarsa argued that his statement is not
as broad as it first seems. In his view, not all state regulation impacting
patent-derived profits is preempted if that regulation only does so
“incidentally” and does not “significantly and directly impede[]
Congress’s purpose in providing the federal patent right.”264
This does not mean that any state regulation that affects a
patentee’s profits so undermines the goals of the patent
system as to be preempted. It is well established that states
can generally regulate patented products as part of their
general exercise of police powers without preemption, even if
this regulation incidentally affects the profits a patentee gains
from its patent. But that states have broad leeway to regulate
patented products does not mean that they have unlimited
ability to do so in situations in which the regulation
significantly and directly impedes Congress’s purpose in
providing the federal patent right.265
Judge Gajarsa concluded his concurrence by asserting that the dissent
“overstates the breath” of the opinion.266 It does not “require the
preemption of ‘any state law regulating the prices of patented
pharmaceutical products.’”267 The opinion is specific to the facts of the
D.C. Act, and a different state law regulating drug prices might avoid
preemption if it “did not only target patent [sic] drugs or did not as
significantly or directly undermine the balance of the federal patent
right.”268
As previously mentioned, BIO v. D.C. has seemingly had a chilling
effect on state efforts to regulate excessively priced patented
medications. No state has enacted direct patented drug price regulation
for unconscionably high prices in the intervening years since BIO v. D.C.
While some recent prescription drug anti-price-gouging bills implicitly
or explicitly cover patented medications, the focus for this kind of
legislation has generally shifted to generic, off-patent medications.269
Even though addressing the excessive costs of patented
medications is urgent for both patients and health systems, with limited
resources and litigious adversaries, states likely have been wary of
triggering claims of patent preemption. Maryland’s failed antigouging
law, for instance, only applied to essential off-patent medications “[f]or
Id. at 1346 n.1 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
266 Id. at 1348.
267 Id. (citation omitted).
268 Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 505 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
269 See supra Section III.B.1.
264
265
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which all federal exclusive marketing rights . . . ha[d] expired.”270 It was
criticized for this focus by Governor Hogan: “This oversight, whether
inadvertent or deliberate, is troubling since the patented or brand-name
pharmaceuticals make up a significant amount of the market and are
often times the most expensive and essential pharmaceuticals.”271 Yet,
the focus on generics was likely deliberate in order to avoid patent
preemption.
Further, at least one district court has expansively interpreted BIO
v. D.C.’s ruling.272 In Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
v. Gilead Sciences, Inc. (“SEPTA”), patients and an employee health plan
sued Gilead over its use of price discrimination and the high U.S. costs of
its hepatitis C drugs Sovaldi and Harvoni.273 At the time of the litigation,
Sovaldi cost $84,000 and Harvoni cost $94,500 for a twelve-week course
of treatment.274 The plaintiffs alleged that, despite Gilead selling the
active ingredient in these drugs (sofosbuvir) for much less in other
countries and giving discounts to certain federal agencies, the pricing of
their hepatitis C drugs thwarted domestic access through insurer
rationing.275 In light of these “bogus” and “exorbitant prices,” plaintiffs
sued Gilead “to stop this unconscionable and unfair conduct, and to
secure appropriate relief for consumers and third party payers who
have been victimized by Gilead’s price gouging scheme.”276 Plaintiffs put
forward a number of state law claims including unjust enrichment,
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and prohibitions against
unfair competition.277
270

Sess.).

MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2-801(b)(1)(i) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Legis.

271 Letter from Governor Hogan, Md. Off. of the Governor, to Honorable Michael E.
Busch, Speaker of the House, Maryland State House (May 26, 2017), https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/MDGOV/2017/05/26/file_attachments/822635/
HB631Letter.pdf; see also Press Release, Ass’n for Accessible Meds., AAM Requests
Federal Injunction to Block Maryland’s Unconstitutional Drug Price Law (July 6, 2017),
https://accessiblemeds.org/resources/press-releases/aam-requests-federal-injunction-block-marylands-unconstitutional-drug (arguing that the law “protects high-priced
brand name drug companies, while it punishes lower cost generic alternatives”).
272 Cf. In re EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Practices & Antitrust
Litig., 336 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1333–1334 (D. Kan. 2018) (rejecting Mylan’s arguments
that state consumer protection claims alleging marketplace misconduct resulting in
higher EpiPen prices were patent preempted). Reconciling this case with SEPTA
suggests a distinction between regulation of a pricing scheme and unfair conduct
impacting price.
273 Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 102 F. Supp. 3d 688, 694–95 (E.D. Pa.
2015).
274 Id.
275 Id. at 695.
276 Id. at 695–96.
277 Id. at 696.
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The court rejected all of plaintiffs’ claims and granted Gilead’s
motion to dismiss. According to the court, “[p]laintiffs’ true complaint
is that Gilead is making too much money and that it is unfair for Gilead
to reap profits based on its high prices for widely needed drugs.”278 The
court found Gilead’s patent preemption arguments to be
“devastating.”279 Relying on BIO v. D.C., Gilead argued “that ‘[g]iven that
it is beyond the authority of a legislature to determine that a
pharmaceutical price is “excessive,” it is a fortiori beyond the authority
of a court applying a vague state law of general application to achieve
the same result.’”280 Following this logic, the court concluded:
To the extent that plaintiffs seek to use state law to challenge
Gilead’s exercise of its exclusive patent rights to make pricing
decisions, plaintiffs’ claims are preempted. Federal patent law
contemplates the tradeoffs between exclusivity and access,
and plaintiffs cannot use state law to adjust that balance by
forcing Gilead to lower its prices or disgorge profits from the
sale of its patented drugs.281
This interpretation of BIO v. D.C. is arguably even more expansive than
the original. The Federal Circuit explicitly stated that the D.C. Act was
problematic in part because, by singling out patented medications, it
was “in no way general.”282 Thus, the court implied that a law of general
application might be able to avoid patent preemption. SEPTA
undermines this language. Gilead’s interpretation of BIO v. D.C., with
which the court appears inclined to agree, deliberately attacks this
guidance. In contrast to the Federal Circuit, this court suggests that state
laws of any kind, whether general or particular, will be patent
preempted when used to address the prices of patented medications;
state laws, in the court’s view, cannot be used to “lower” prices or
“disgorge” profits when a drug is patent protected.
D. Patent Preemption Revisited
The Federal Circuit’s ruling in BIO v. D.C. is provocative. There are
prima facie compelling arguments, as the court lays out, to think that
state price regulation of patented medications ought to be patent
preempted. The patent system is, after all, a federal scheme and
Congress ought to have the final say in how exclusive rights are balanced

Id. at 704.
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 102 F. Supp. 3d at 703.
280 Id. at 702 (citation omitted).
281 Id. at 703 (footnote omitted).
282 Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
278
279
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against access to inventions in the public domain. The Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause provides that federal law is “the supreme Law of the
Land,”283 meaning “that when federal and state law conflict, federal law
prevails and state law is preempted.”284
Yet, as argued below, Congress had not and still (more than a
decade later) has not addressed the problem of excessively-priced
patented medications during the patent period. Thus, there is a
regulatory vacuum which states can fill. Further, this is a vacuum that
states should fill. Preemption is costly, both in human and fiscal terms.
The existing federal patent scheme, operating without federal
correction, imposes tragic choices on individuals and states. These costs
and the privileging of private gain untethered to constitutional or
statutory purpose are unjustified, both doctrinally and as a matter of
public policy. The Federal Circuit’s arguments in BIO v. D.C. therefore
ought to be revisited. This is particularly so given a policy preference
for excessive price regulation over alternatives.
1. The Presumption Against Preemption
To determine whether a state statute is preempted, Supreme Court
preemption jurisprudence involves “two cornerstones.”285 First,
congressional purpose is the “ultimate touchstone.”286 Second, there is
a presumption “that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to
be superseded . . . [absent] the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”287
Beginning with the latter, while much about the presumption
against preemption is debated,288 it remains an ongoing tool in Supreme
Court preemption analysis.289 The Federal Circuit in BIO v. D.C.,
however, gives it but a glancing look.290 The court simply notes that
D.C.’s “general police power within its borders” is “unquestioned,” as is
the fact that patent rights “‘must be enjoyed in subordination to this
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018).
285 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009); see, e.g., McCuskey, supra note 236 at
108–109.
286 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 (citation omitted).
287 Id. (citation omitted).
288 See, e.g., New Evidence on the Presumption against Preemption: An Empirical Study
of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1604, 1605 (2007).
289 See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 18–19 (2014).
290 Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2007); Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 505 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (“I think that the panel failed to give adequate consideration
to the presumption against preemption.”).
283
284
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general authority of the State over all property within its limits.’”291
Presumably, because it found the D.C. Act to conflict with the HatchWaxman Act, the court concludes in the next sentence that “general state
power must yield to specific congressional enactment.”292 Since D.C.’s
law was not general, it stood “exclusively[] within the scope of the
patent laws.”293
In light of a tension between the Supremacy Clause and the
underlying principles of federalism within the Constitution, the U.S.
Supreme Court has drawn on a presumption against preemption as “a
canonical caveat” in cases involving historic state police powers.294 It
establishes, as a rebuttable default, that there is no congressional intent
to preempt. When “historic police powers of the States” are involved,
courts are to “start with the assumption” that these powers “were not to
be superseded by the Federal Act.”295 Those arguing to the court that
there is preemption have the burden of providing evidence of Congress’s
“clear and manifest purpose” to do so.296 This purpose can be shown
through express or implied preemption.297
Historic state police powers are broad and empower states to
regulate diverse kinds of activities.298 Though the scope of state police
powers has ebbed and flowed over the years, health regulations have a
long history of being among states’ core police powers.299 Consensus
exists among courts and commentators that state regulations for the
health, safety, and welfare for their citizens are within the boundaries of
states’ authority.300 As observed in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, states
have the authority to enact “health laws of every description.”301 These
laws, however, must be “reasonable.”302

291 Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (quoting Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 348 (1880)).
292 Id.
293 Id. at 1373–74.
294 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules As Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 607 (1992).
295 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
296 Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516
(1992).
297 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (citations omitted).
298 McCuskey, supra note 236, at 113–14.
299 Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PENN J. CONST.
L. 745, 793–94 (2007).
300 McCuskey, supra note 236, at 113–14.
301 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
302 Id.; see also Wendy Parmet, Rediscovering Jacobson in the Era of COVID-19, 100
B.U. L. REV. ONLINE 117, 124–26 (2020).
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State regulations to protect against price gouging or to otherwise
regulate prices in the name of public welfare have long been recognized
as legitimate ends of state police powers.303 Likewise, state payment
regulation is familiar.304 The Supreme Court has held that businesses do
not have constitutional rights to “inflict injury upon the public at large,
or upon any substantial group of the people.”305 Thus, “in the absence
of other constitutional restriction[s], a state is free to adopt whatever
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare,
and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose.”306 The
Court explicitly stated that states’ ability to regulate any aspect of a
business includes product pricing.307 As with “any other form of
regulation,” state price regulations are “unconstitutional only if
arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the
legislature is free to adopt.”308
Furthermore, the mere fact that a regulated product is patented
does not automatically displace appropriate regulation under a state’s
police powers.309 State legislation that can be adopted in the absence of
a patent, “may equally” be adopted in its presence.310 The Supreme
Court explains:
Congress never intended that the patent laws should displace
the police powers of the States, meaning by that term those
powers by which the health, good order, peace, and general
welfare of the community are promoted. Whatever rights are
secured to inventors must be enjoyed in subordination to this
general authority of the State over all property within its
limits.311
The Court specified, however, that states cannot interfere with “the
incorporeal right”—the exclusive rights granted to patent holders.312
While states may exercise the police powers to regulate patented
products, they cannot regulate the patent rights themselves.

Nebbia v. People of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524–25 (1934); In re Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 768–69 (1968).
304 See Feldman et al., supra note 45, at 41, 48; Erin C. Fuse Brown, Resurrecting
Health Care Rate Regulation, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 85, 129 (2015).
305 Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 538–39.
306 Id. at 537.
307 Id.
308 Id. at 539; see also Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11 (1988).
309 Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 503, 505 (1878).
310 Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 347 (1880).
311 Id. at 347–48.
312 Id. at 347.
303
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It may seem a close call whether excessive drug pricing laws
regulate the product or the underlying right. On the one hand,
regulation of patented drug prices implicates the amount of reward a
patent holder can receive during its period of exclusivity. More
specifically, by restricting what a patent holder can charge, it regulates
the incentive offered by exclusivity.
On the other hand, a great many things a state does influences the
price a drug manufacturer can charge for its patented product. Why
think that price regulation is different? Price regulation is not
regulation of the exclusive right conferred by a patent, which is all that
a patent provides. Price regulation has nothing to do with the ability to
exclude others, and as already mentioned, patent rights confer no rights
to particular rewards.
This understanding logically coheres with the recognized ability of
states to tax patent royalties313 and to prohibit the sale of patented
products within their jurisdictions.314 In Patterson v. Kentucky, for
instance, the Supreme Court upheld a statute condemning certain oils as
unsafe and imposing a penalty on sales of such oils within the state.315
There was no way for the patented oil at issue to meet the standards
imposed by the statute,316 yet the Court ruled for the state, asserting that
the statute’s “enforcement causes no necessary conflict with national
authority, and interferes with no right secured by federal legislation, to
the patentee or his assigns.”317 Excessive drug price regulation falls far
short of prohibiting the sale of products. An exclusive right is only as
valuable as background and market conditions permit, and states are
within their authority to regulate those conditions. Excessive patented
price regulation does not regulate the incorporeal right itself. 318
For these reasons, state excessive patented drug price regulations
ought to be accorded a presumption against preemption. The
fundamental purpose of these regulations is to protect the health and
welfare of a state’s citizens, and regulations of this kind have long been
considered within the police powers of states. These are reasonable
regulations that states can use to achieve their legitimate goals.
Moreover, as argued below, there is no “clear and manifest
purpose” in the federal patent laws to displace state regulation of
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 128 (1932).
Patterson, 97 U.S. at 503.
315 Id. at 502–03.
316 Id. at 503.
317 Id. at 509.
318 See Brief for the Nat’l Legis. Ass’n on Prescription Drug Prices et al., supra note
229 (arguing that the D.C. Act regulated patented products).
313
314
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excessive pricing, or state payment regulation impacting patented
products. The presumption is not rebutted. There is no obstacle
preemption: excessive price regulation need not be an impediment to
federal purposes. The prices of patented drug products are almost
completely unregulated federally, and there is no constitutional nor
congressional purpose to guarantee patent-holders certain economic
rewards.319 The patent laws do not exist to enrich patent holders.
Further, applying Judge Gajarsa’s suggested criteria, excessive price
regulation only incidentally and neither significantly nor directly
impedes the purpose of the federal patent scheme. Any intersection of
these laws with a purpose to incentivize innovation is incidental, they
do not alter the scope of exclusive rights in any way, and by focusing on
price excessiveness they are compatible with a federal purpose to
incentivize.
2. Congressional Purpose
The Federal Circuit found that the D.C. Act was specifically conflict
preempted by the Hatch-Waxman Act.320 In doing so, the court drew on
Supreme Court patent preemption precedent321 that “state regulation of
intellectual property must yield to the extent that it clashes with the
balance struck by Congress in our patent laws.”322 That balance refers
to the “tension between” free use of “inventive resources” and “an
incentive to deploy those resources.”323 “Where it is clear how the
See supra Part II.
Debate exists in the academic literature regarding the appropriate patent
preemption standard, with some scholars arguing for focus on the IP Clause rather than
congressional intent. Fromer, supra note 232, at 265; Camilla A. Hrdy, The Reemergence
of State Anti-Patent Law, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 133, 140–41 (2018). Regarding BIO v. DC,
Hrdy observes that the Federal Circuit is “quite patentee-protective” and that conflict
preemption is misguided. According to Hrdy, “[a] state price restriction law that does
not significantly affect patentees’ incentive to invent and commercialize should not be
preempted.” Id. at 212.
321 The Supreme Court considered patent preemption on several occasions, but this
caselaw’s underlying fact patterns are not of direct assistance. See Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234
(1964); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989). State regulation of patented drug
prices raises the possibility of diminishing the potential rewards of a federally granted
right. By contrast, the Court’s patent preemption caselaw “almost exclusively addresses
laws granting rights on top of those granted by the patent system, not ones cutting back
on federal patent rights.” Roger Allan Ford, The Uneasy Case for Patent Federalism, 2017
Wis. L. Rev. 551, 561–62 (2017); Hrdy, The Reemergence of State Anti-Patent Law, supra
note 320, at 194–97; see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L.
REV. 1579, 1583 (2015).
322 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152.
323 Id.
319
320
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patent laws strike that balance in a particular circumstance, that is not
a judgment the States may second-guess.”324 The Hatch-Waxman Act, in
the court’s view, purportedly provides how Congress sought to strike
this balance for pharmaceuticals.
Yet, the Federal Circuit’s reliance on the Hatch-Waxman Act is
misplaced.325 It is far from obvious that the D.C. Act—or any excessive
price regulation more generally—must undermine the purposes and
balance struck in the Hatch-Waxman Act. The same is true of the
BPCIA—an analogous law enacted in 2010 that pertains to biologics and
biosimilars.326 Neither law regulates prices—excessive or otherwise—
of patented medications.
Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, and it is generally
described as the great compromise between brand and generic drug
manufacturers; it aims to balance the availability of lower cost generic
drugs upon patent expiration with the incentivization of new drugs.327
The Hatch-Waxman Act sought to remedy two issues.328
First, it sought to maintain incentives for brand name, or originator
drug manufacturers.329 Under the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments
to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the FDA required drug
manufacturers “to prove that their drugs were safe and efficacious
before the drugs could be sold.”330 Originator drug manufacturers
argued that these new requirements “unfairly shortened their effective
exclusivity periods by requiring a lengthy process of clinical testing and
FDA review.”331 In response, Congress granted patent term extensions
to restore some of the time lost to regulatory review.332 Firms could
receive up to an additional five years of patent exclusivity, but patent
expiration could not be extended beyond fourteen years post-FDA
Id.
See Sarnoff, supra note 45, at 33–34; Lockwood, supra note 236, at 177. See
generally Brief for the Nat’l Legis. Ass’n on Prescription Drug Prices et al., supra note
229, at 9.
326 Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§
7001–03, 124 Stat. 804-21 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012)).
Given the Federal Circuit’s discussion of the Hatch-Waxman Act, that is the focus of this
discussion.
327 Orrin G. Hatch, The 30th Anniversary of the Hatch-Waxman Act: Foreword, 40 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1194, 1194–95 (2014).
328 See id.; see also Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns
30: Do We Need A Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 301 (2015).
329 Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 328.
330 Id. at 297.
331 Id. at 306.
332 Id.
324
325
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approval.333 In addition to patent term restoration, the Hatch-Waxman
Act established several non-patent exclusivities for the FDA to
implement. For instance, new chemical entities would receive five years
of data exclusivity, during which time generic competitors would be
prevented from submitting an application for FDA approval.334
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the Hatch-Waxman Act
sought to create new pathways to speed up market entry of generics and
end the de facto exclusivity extension for originator drugs.335 The
Kefauver-Harris Amendments applied to FDA review of all drug
manufacturers, regardless of whether they were originators with patent
protection or generics without; all drug manufacturers would need to
expend substantial resources on new clinical trials to complete the
regulatory process.336 Yet, generics did not have strong economic
incentives to enter the market given a lack of patent-protection, the
existence of at least one competitor, and the expense of completing the
same regulatory requirements of originators.337 Further, due to a
Federal Circuit ruling, generic manufacturers were barred from even
beginning the testing necessary for FDA approval prior to the
originator’s patent expiration.338 This meant that patent-holders’
period of exclusivity enjoyed a de facto extension.339 To remedy these
problems, the Hatch-Waxman Act created an abbreviated new drug
application pathway (“ANDA”), through which generic manufacturers
could seek FDA approval.340 It further permitted generic manufacturers
to experiment with patent protected medications in preparation for
submitting an ANDA.341
While the Hatch-Waxman Act has “indisputably . . . galvanize[d]” an
industry of lower cost generic drugs,342 the benefits of generic entry are
conditioned upon patent expiration, invalidation, or noninfringement.343 Through a 180-day exclusivity period,344 the Act
incentivizes generic applicants to challenge an originator’s patents as
either invalid or noninfringed. If a patent is invalid, then the patent
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344

35 U.S.C. § 156.
21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).
Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 328, at 301; 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j).
Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 328, at 298.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 300.
Id.
Id. at 302; 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j).
Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 328, at 305; 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 328, at 309.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).

WOLITZ (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

11/12/21 3:38 PM

PATENTED DRUG PRICES

439

should not have existed in the first instance. If a patent is non-infringed,
then the generic applicant competes beyond the scope of the exclusive
right. Thus, the Hatch-Waxman Act can encourage competition during
the patent term in addition to facilitating generic competition upon
patent expiration. Encouraging competition during the patent period,
however, does not address excessive drug pricing and does not regulate
patented drug prices.
Thus, the Hatch-Waxman Act does not regulate prices—excessive
or otherwise—of patented medications. It facilitates competition and
seeks to correct for time lost on patent protection by the regulatory
process. There is no indication of congressional purpose to preempt
state price regulation through an inference about the law’s negative
space. 345 It is a stretch to infer that a congressional purpose to facilitate
competition in the Hatch-Waman Act reveals congressional intent that
prices during the patent term must remain utterly unregulated by
states.346
The court argues that the D.C. Act conflicts with the Hatch-Waxman
Act because of the “central role of enhanced profits in the statutory
incentive scheme it has developed.”347 As evidence, the court cites to
legislative history, noting the importance of supra-competitive prices
for incentivizing innovation.348 Yet, this history (discussing the patent
term extension part of the legislation) merely notes that patents
“‘enable innovators to obtain greater profits than could have been
obtained if direct competition existed. These profits act as incentives
for innovative activities.’”349 Neither this cited Committee Report nor a
subsequent one offer any more compelling evidence in support of a
purpose to preempt state-level excessive price preemption.350
Furthermore, the court’s position both ignores Congress’s less
deferential posture towards patents by incentivizing competition
during the patent period through a showing of noninfringement and
makes a logical flaw. The assumption that supra-competitive pricing is
necessarily incompatible with regulation of excessive pricing, or,
345

at 10.

Brief for the Nat’l Legis. Ass’n on Prescription Drug Prices et al., supra note 229,

346 See id. at 9–10; Brief for Defendant-Appellants, Biotechnology Indus. Org. v.
District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007), (No. 2006-1593), 2006 WL
3382103, at *13.
347 Biotechnology Indus. Org., 496 F.3d at 1373.
348 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2650).
349 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17 (1984)).
350 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984) (Conf. Rep.); see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt.
2 (1984) (Conf. Rep.).
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conversely, that excessive price regulation is necessarily an obstacle to
supra-competitive pricing, is a mistake. As explained in Part I, a price
might be supra-competitive, yet neither excessive nor unfair. Above
market pricing, absent additional details, is not in itself sufficient to
justify regulation.
Broader consideration of the purposes of federal patent law—
beyond the specifics of the Hatch-Waxman Act—also yields the
conclusion that state patented price regulation should not necessarily
be preempted. Patent law, as previously discussed, serves three
primary objectives, of which only one raises a credible potential conflict:
the purpose of incentivizing innovation.351 But again, it is unclear why
state-level excessive price regulation must inevitably undermine, or be
an obstacle to, innovation incentives.
IV. AVOIDING PREEMPTION AND REIMAGINING STATE PARTICIPATION IN
FEDERAL PATENT POLICY
The Federal Circuit’s ruling should not preempt, on patent law
grounds, state level excessive price regulation that reaches patented
medications. This is so doctrinally as well as from the perspective of
public policy. States should not be blocked from addressing the urgent
problems of prescription drug access and affordability given federal
abdication of corrective action. This precedent must be avoided or fixed.
Since BIO v. D.C. remains good law, important practical questions
remain regarding how states might proceed. Given a moral and political
preference for price regulation over payment regulation, what
characteristics might the next generation of state-level excessive drug
price regulations incorporate, and are they workable? Does payment
regulation escape patent preemption? What other options might states
consider for improving the affordability of excessively priced patented
medications? Five options are considered below: (1) congressional
amendment; (2) the shield of sovereign immunity; (3) revised general
excessive pricing regulations; (4) tax penalties on price increases; and
(5) payment regulation.352
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); see, e.g., Burk &
Lemley, supra note 64, at 1576. Cf. Lockwood, supra note 236, at 176–77.
352 States might further consider the possibility of shepherding a new excessive
patented drug pricing statute through a different circuit court. Any new pricing
regulation that meaningfully reaches the prices of patented medications is very likely to
face litigation. The procedural history of BIO v. D.C. has the interesting wrinkle that D.C.
originally appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia and then filed an unopposed motion to transfer the case to the Federal Circuit.
Given its notoriously pro-patent stance, the District’s rationale for this transfer is
unclear. Moreover, the Federal Circuit itself raised the issue of its subject matter
351
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This section further considers some of the larger themes raised by
state-level drug pricing reform. States’ ability to serve as second-best
solutions highlights their potentially underappreciated role in shaping
pharmaceutical innovation policy as both collaborators and influencers.
They can help recalibrate federal patent innovation policy to align with
its intended public-serving purpose. States, unfettered by patent
preemption, can correct for an incredibly harmful instance of federal
regulatory failure that is neither legally mandated nor consistent with
good public policy. Further, as “laboratories of experimentation,”353
they can influence national conversations about innovation incentives
and fair drug pricing.
A. Congressional Amendment
Before considering state-level legislative approaches, a first option
is the avoidance of price regulation patent preemption through
congressional amendment.
States could lobby Congress to
unequivocally clear the way for states to fill the existing regulatory
vacuum; Congress could supersede the Federal Circuit’s ruling through
legislation expressly asserting that state excessive drug price regulation
reaching patented drugs is not preempted.
This proposal initially sounds counterintuitive. The need for state
intervention stems from congressional inaction and uncertainty.
Congress has not itself resolved the problem of excessively priced
patented drugs, yet here it is being suggested that states turn to
Congress. Several factors support this strategy. Such legislation gives
the appearance of federal action on an issue of immense political
importance without Congress directly needing to do anything: it can
punt the issue. Without giving up its ultimate authority to legislate,
Congress can permit states to intervene in the interim if they want. This
solution may be lower stakes than existing congressional proposals for
drug pricing reform. The legislation could be fairly straightforward and
budget neutral.
Seeking congressional amendment freeing states to address the
urgent problems posed by excessively priced patented medications
could be an effective tactic. Given the existing political climate, however,
it is most likely best conceived as a longer-term strategy for states. Such

jurisdiction over the case sua sponte. Biotechnology Indus. Org., 496 F.3d at 1367.
Amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) and new U.S. Supreme Court precedent in the
intervening years, however, appears to foreclose a way around the Federal Circuit. See
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a); see also Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064–65 (2013).
353 See Riley & Lanford, supra note 7, at 82.
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an amendment is likely to face intense opposition from industry trade
associations and their members.
B. The Shield of Sovereign Immunity
Rather than lobby Congress, craft excessive price regulations, or
institute payment initiatives, states could consider utilizing their
sovereign immunity to make excessively priced medications more
affordable both for themselves and their constituents.354 If states can
practice a patent without liability, this raises the possibility that they
could manufacture otherwise patent-protected medications. Indeed,
there has been recent interest in government manufacture of generics
in California.355 Sovereign immunity raises the prospect that this policy
solution can apply more broadly to the most fiscally significant
medications: those that are patent protected.
U.S. Supreme Court precedent suggests this strategy is doctrinally
viable. In 1992, Congress passed a sweeping amendment expressly
abrogating state sovereign immunity for claims of patent
infringement.356 The Supreme Court, however, later ruled that states
cannot be stripped of their sovereign immunity under the Intellectual
Property Clause, and that this particular attempt was an invalid exercise
of congressional authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.357 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this ruling and
its principles in a similar copyright case.358
While Congress retains the ability to abrogate sovereign immunity
under the Fourteenth Amendment, its powers are remedial.359 Valid
exercise of section 5 authority must be congruent and proportional.360
Thus, “Congress must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative
scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.”361 Importantly for
354 Cf. Sapna Kumar, Promoting Public Health Through State Sovereign Immunity, U.
PA. J.L. & INNOVATION (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3846434 (proposing reliance on state sovereign immunity to address
patented drug shortages during the COVID-19 pandemic).
355 Sophia Bollag, New Law Paves Way for California to Make Its Own Insulin, Generic
Drugs in Effort to Lower Costs, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article246036870.html.
356 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
630 (1999).
357 Id.
358 Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020).
359 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 627–28.
360 Id. at 652 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)); Allen, 140 S.
Ct. at 1004.
361 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 627–28.
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present purposes, the Court made clear that what is at issue are due
process violations: state-implemented patent infringement on its own
does not violate due process. Patent infringement without a sufficiently
adequate remedy does.
[U]nder the plain terms of the Clause and the clear import of
our precedent, a State’s infringement of a patent, though
interfering with a patent owner’s right to exclude others, does
not by itself violate the Constitution. Instead, only where the
State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to
injured patent owners for its infringement of their patent
could a deprivation of property without due process result.362
The congressional amendments exposing states to liability for patent
infringement in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board
v. College Savings Bank neither addressed conduct transgressing the
Fourteenth Amendment nor were proportional to the perceived
problem.
As Justice Kagan recently recounted, these patent
amendments had no limitations:
Florida Prepaid held, the Patent Remedy Act swept too far.
Recall what the Patent Remedy Act did—and did not. It
abrogated sovereign immunity for any and every patent suit
. . . it exposed all States to the hilt—on a record that failed to
show they had caused any discernible constitutional harm (or,
indeed, much harm at all).363
The statute did not distinguish between negligent and intentional
infringement, nor did it “target States refusing to offer alternative
remedies to patent holders.”364
State-level government manufacturing of patented medications
would involve intentional infringement, yet the key issue appears to be
ensuring the availability of adequate infringement remedies. It is
beyond the scope of this Article to consider the details of an optimal
state scheme protected by sovereign immunity,365 but exploring robust
Id. at 643.
Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1005 (citation omitted).
364 Id.
365 One thought is perhaps states could explore a “1498 for states”—that is,
implementing statutes analogous to 28 U.S.C. § 1498. Section 1498 is a partial waiver of
the federal government’s sovereign immunity. The federal government consents to suit
by patent holders in the United States Court of Federal Claims, and a patent holder’s only
remedy to the government’s unlicensed use of patents is “reasonable and entire
compensation for such use and manufacture.” 28 U.S.C. § 1498. Section 1498 might be
used to combat excessively priced patented medications, and it has been used to
purchase cheaper generic versions of patented medications. Brennan et al., supra note
50, at 303–304. A state-level statute of this kind, however, raises many additional
questions and legal complexities.
362
363
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use of sovereign immunity to address problems of excessive drug
pricing is prima facie promising. It has the benefit of potentially
regulating in a manner similar to direct excessive price regulation by
controlling the prices of government-manufactured medications. At the
very least, it could be of use in negotiations and serve as a “catalyst for
change.”366
Utilizing sovereign immunity for government manufacture also has
several disadvantages. First, patent protection is not the only kind of
exclusivity of concern. States would also need to grapple with
overcoming any applicable non-patent exclusivities. Second, use of
sovereign immunity would saddle state governments not just with the
task of crafting adequate remedies, but further with any challenges
associated with manufacturing medications. These could include
challenges pertaining to resources and various kinds of expertise as well
as obtaining relevant scientific know-how or information protected by
trade secret. Finally, depending upon a policy’s specifics, if the judiciary
is tasked with making determinations of adequate compensation, this
could have the comparative disadvantage of introducing increased
instability and a lack of predictability into pharmaceutical markets. In
short, strategic use of state sovereign immunity appears a promising
option, but any such policies require further development and
consideration.
C. Excessive Patented Drug Price Regulation 2.0
In reformulating comprehensive excessive patented price
regulation, three primary options are initially apparent. First, states
could pursue price-gouging laws of general application. Second, states
could pursue such laws of limited reach. Third, states could craft laws
that demonstrably do not interfere with non-excessive prices—as
benchmarked to the goals of federal patent law. A fourth adjacent
option regulates via a tax penalty. While new state legislative proposals
to penalize unsupported or excessive price increases do essentially
regulate excessive prices, this approach is distinct from more traditional
price-gouging legislative efforts and is therefore discussed separately in
the next section.
In striking down the D.C. Act, the court criticized the law for being
“in no way general.”367 Further, Judge Gajarsa, in his subsequent
concurrence, wrote that state laws might avoid patent preemption if
they only incidentally, insignificantly, and indirectly “imped[ed]”
Kumar, supra note 354, at 16.
Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F. 3d 1362, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
366
367
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congressional purpose.368 It is tolerably clear what the Federal Circuit
means for a law to be general. Excessive patented drug prices should
not be singled out. Price-gouging legislation applicable to prescription
drugs needs to address all drugs, not just those that are patented. 369
Recent state price-gouging bills that cover patented medications adhere
to this guidance; they cover both patented and unpatented or generic
medications.370 Latching onto the court’s language, some have argued
that framing laws as ones of general application is curative.371
States can and should take up this suggestion. Yet, it is unclear why
this framing change matters. If a general price-gouging law still reaches
patented medications, could it not be invalidated on patent preemption
grounds, as applied to patented products? Further, given that patented
medications are more likely to be extraordinarily expensive, such laws
would target these drugs for examination of excessiveness. If
broadening the scope of an excessive price law is all it takes to survive
patent preemption, this is an easy fix. This change, however, hardly
seems transformative, so much as cosmetic. It is a suggestion to bury
the lede. While, of course, one cannot know with certainty, it seems
dubious that the court would have cleared the D.C. Act if only it were
crafted as a general law.
Instead of focusing exclusively on generality, states could pursue
excessive pricing regulation of limited ambition. Following the guidance
offered by Judge Gajarsa, states could search for a form of price
regulation that has an obvious and relatively uncontroverted negligible
impact on patent-derived innovation incentives. Excessive price
regulation can take different forms—from traditional rate setting to
price-gouging laws targeting price increases during emergencies.
Several states have emergency price-gouging laws that explicitly
reach prescription medications.372 The emergency law approach,
however, given that these laws are predicated on a severe and
unanticipated market disruption, suggests that their application to the

368 Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 505 F. 3d 1343, 1346 n.1 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
369 Even so, how general is general enough? Need a law apply even more broadly to
cover medical products and services or some category construed more broadly still?
370 See, e.g., supra III.B.1 (discussing Minnesota’s H.F. 4, which applies to both
patented and unpatented medications).
371 Lockwood, supra note 236; Alexander Walsdorf, I Get by with A Little Help from My
750-Dollar-Per-Tablet Friends: A Model Act for States to Prevent Dramatic Pharmaceutical Price Increases, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2497, 2534–35 (2018) (distinguishing a proposed
model act from the D.C. Act on the basis of its more general application, among other
features).
372 Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26, at 898 n.279 ; see also H.R. 7040, supra note 188.
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general problem of excessively priced patented medications would
likely be difficult.373 Perhaps they could reach price spikes involving
drug shortages during the current pandemic, but it would likely be a
stretch for them to accommodate drug manufacturers’ routine price
increases, and they are vulnerable to gaming through launch price
manipulation.
But emergency price-gouging laws, for the most part, seem to avoid
the Federal Circuit’s concerns. Perhaps the occasion for litigation
simply has not arisen, but emergency price-gouging laws have not been
subject to patent preemption challenges. Emergency price-gouging
laws are of general application, but what is notable is that these laws
apply under a narrow set of circumstances—specified, time-limited
emergencies. The United States’ mismanagement prolonging the
domestic COVID-19 pandemic notwithstanding, these laws assume
emergencies that are both rare and relatively short-lived. Consequently,
these laws do not impede Congress’s purpose of incentivizing
innovation through a patent system at all. If it is only in the rare time of
an emergency when patented prices are regulated, then the assumption
is that the impact of these laws is negligible.
More importantly, however, these laws are distinct from the kind
of excessive pricing laws contemplated in this Article: emergency pricegouging laws do not seek to regulate a patent-derived premium at all,
but rather a premium procured in excess of that made possible by a
patent due to emergency conditions. For these reasons, pursuit of an
emergency price-gouging law, while possible, is not a generally
compelling strategy for the problem at hand.374 It is a very limited and
likely ineffectual mechanism for addressing fundamental problems with
excessive patented drug pricing that occur both through introduction
prices and through routine, non-emergency price hikes.375
The question, then, is how to imagine what a more ambitious form
of excessive price regulation might look like. The Federal Circuit baldly
rejected the D.C. Act:
The underlying determination about the proper balance
between innovators’ profit and consumer access to
medication, though, is exclusively one for Congress to make.
As the Supreme Court has noted, “[w]here it is clear how the

373
374
375

Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26, at 953.
See Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26, at 953.
Id.
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patent laws strike that balance in a particular circumstance,
that is not a judgment the States may second-guess.”376
As argued above, contrary to the conclusions the court draws about the
Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress has not spoken on the matter of excessive
patented drug pricing. Moreover, note the subtle shift in framing. The
court frames the relevant balance as one between profits and access.
This shift is misleading. The crucial question is whether state regulation
poses an obstacle to Congress’s incentive scheme.
Thus, to render the argument more explicit, the court seems to rely
on something like the following premise: determinations of excessive
pricing have the mandatory prerequisite of determining when pricing is
not excessive. Determinations of non-excessive pricing, in turn, must
incorporate considerations of sufficient innovation incentives. If states
are to reconcile their excessive price regulation with congressional
purpose to incentivize innovation, they would need to engage with the
underlying question of how much profit during the patent term is
sufficient for the innovation to have occurred. The problem is the nonpreempted execution of excessive pricing statutes requires preempted
determinations. It is conducting the very analysis that demonstrates a
state’s scheme lacks conflict that generates the conflict.
This conclusion embraces, rather than spurns, suboptimal policy
and regulatory failure. Neither is legally required nor desirable. Having
considered the matters of the presumption against preemption and
congressional purpose discussed above, there are strong reasons to
think that excessive patented pricing regulations, including the version
proposed by the D.C. Act, are not patent preempted. State-level
excessive pricing regulation does not regulate the “incorporeal right.” It
does not alter the exclusive right that actually comprises patent
protection. Further, rights in patented products “must be enjoyed
subject to the complete and salutary power with which the States have
never parted, of so defining and regulating the sale and use of property
within their respective limits as to afford protection to the many against
the injurious conduct of the few.”377 Given that the Supreme Court has
upheld state regulations that effectively prohibit the sale of patented
products,378 state regulation of excessive drug prices should be both
376 Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
377 Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 506 (1878).
378 Id. at 501, 508 (noting that there was no way for the patented oil to conform to
statutory requirements and further discussing a patented invention for drawing
lotteries and Delaware’s prohibition of lotteries); see also id. at 508:
It therefore cannot be admitted that the plaintiffs have a right to use an
invention for drawing lotteries in this State, merely because they have a
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absolutely and comparatively unproblematic. This should be the end of
the matter.
To the extent, however, one remains unconvinced by this
argument—the nexus between excessive price regulation and
congressional purpose to incentivize is thought to be just too close—
patent preemption is not the conclusion.
The conclusion is
reconciliation. And reconciliation requires an analysis with which the
Federal Circuit appears to think that states should not engage. Yet, if
foreclosing this possibility is neither legally required nor good policy, it
is deeply troubling.
For state excessive patented price regulations to withstand patent
preemption—under a theory of obstacle preemption—they should be
able to demonstrate their reconcilability with Congress’s goal to provide
sufficient incentives through patent rights. States should be able to
demonstrate that there is regulatory space for the enactment of
excessive patented drug price regulation. This reconciliation appears to
require that states, in some form, engage with an underlying
determination of how much profit is sufficient to achieve these
objectives. They need an argument and methodology for sorting
between instances of excessive and non-excessive pricing, as
determined by reference to federal patent policy.379 Without some
sense of the amount of reward that provides sufficient incentives, it will
be correspondingly difficult to argue that excessive price regulation
does not run afoul of federal patent law’s mandate.
Take, for instance, the D.C. Act. International reference pricing is a
metric of increasing popularity in U.S. domestic discussions of drug
pricing.380 Not only do some claim that it is unfair that Americans pay
patent for it under the United States. A person might with as much
propriety claim a right to commit murder with an instrument, because he
held a patent for it as a new and useful invention.
379 Note that reconciling state statutes that prohibit egregious instances of patented
drug price-gouging generates a paradox. Reconciliation of state law with federal law
appears to have the practical effect of enlarging a patent holder’s rights. Under federal
patent law, patent holders are not guaranteed any rewards at all. State law compatibility
appears to require pricing consistent with sufficient incentives as a floor. The irony is
that if states regulate excessive patented drug pricing, the exclusive rights of patent
holders begin to look a bit more affirmative. There is a protected return below, which
states may not regulate due to the risk of undermining federal patent policy. Cf. Brief for
Defendant-Appellants, Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, supra note 346,
at 14 (arguing that excessive price regulation operating outside a “zone of protection
that Congress reasonably could have meant to give the patent holder” is not preempted).
380 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., HHS Advances Payment
Model to Lower Drug Costs for Patients (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/
news/2018/10/25/hhs-advances-payment-model-to-lower-drug-costs-for-patients.html; Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act, supra note 123.
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more for the same drugs relative to our high-income country
counterparts,381 but it has also been suggested that this overpayment is
excessive by reference to what companies need to recoup their
reasonable costs and make a reasonable profit.382 In the case of the D.C.
Act, patented drug prices 30 percent and above those charged in
specified high-income countries were presumed excessive. Yet, if one
overlooks the D.C. Act’s statutory safeguard of a rebuttable presumption,
from an incentive perspective, one can understand initial concern about
this threshold. Without more information and justification, reference
pricing—that is basing one price off the price of another—bears no
obvious and explicit relationship to ensuring compatibility with the
incentives fundamental to the purposes of federal patent law. A drug
might be priced extremely low in the referenced countries, in which case
even a 30 percent premium may offer an insufficient incentive to drug
manufacturers. The opposite could also be true. To the extent that
prices in referenced countries already overcompensate patentees, a 30
percent increase above those prices would overcompensate patentees
that much more. In short, more information is required to establish
definitively that the D.C. Act’s presumption of excessive prices would be
unlikely to undermine the objectives of federal patent law.
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to advocate for a
particular methodology, broadly speaking, in constructing non-obstacle
excessive patented pricing legislation, states must grapple with at least
two key questions. First, what are the informational and normative
requirements for determining that excessive price legislation does not
undermine patent incentives?
A determination of sufficient incentives will involve questions
about a drug manufacturer’s costs as well as a defensible metric for
evaluating a reasonable return on investment. Both are fraught topics.
As Michelle Mello and I have argued elsewhere, these kinds of
calculations involve “bumpy roads.”383 Our evaluation of public utilities
rate-of-return regulation revealed that while there are compelling
similarities between the idea of public utilities regulation and excessive
drug price regulation, these regulatory determinations are complex and

381 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., What You Need to Know
About President Trump Cutting Down on Foreign Freeloading (Oct. 25, 2018), https://
www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/10/25/ipi-policy-brief.html.
382 Yu et al., supra note 104.
383 Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26, at 963.
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contentious.384 They would be perhaps even more so when applied in
the context of prescription medications.385
Rate-of-return regulation generally suffers from at least three
problems: information asymmetries; time and resource intensive
processes in establishing formula inputs; and perverse incentives for
firms to be inefficient if returns are based on costs.386 These problems
would presumably apply to excessive price regulation of patented
prescription medications as well. Much of the necessary information
pertaining to drug manufacturers’ costs, for instance, is not publicly
available, and companies are reticent to share such information. State
prescription drug price transparency laws have begun to assemble
reported information. Yet, often, important information is withheld as
protected because it is non-public.387 Further complexities absent from
electricity regulation also attend to the prescription drug context. For
instance, biopharmaceutical companies frequently sell many products,
whereas electricity companies sell one, and pharmaceutical markets
have entrants and exits that electricity markets do not.388
For these reasons, the second, and crucial question, states would
need to consider is practical. Are there minimally burdensome ways to
demonstrate that an excessive price legislation does not undermine
patent incentives? The less this exercise involves a process like
traditional rate-setting and resembles a prescription medication
specific excessive pricing law with its own standard, the better. It is
unclear, however, what this mechanism might look like. These practical
challenges could mean that state patented drug price regulation would
not be an easy lift if a showing of non-conflict with sufficient patent
incentives is required. Thus, while state excessive patented drug price
regulation ought to be able to address the problem of excessively priced
patented medications, it is not without challenges.
D. Tax Penalties
As discussed above, states are now experimenting with a new kind
of regulation that specifically targets the widespread problem of price
increases. Price increases are “a major driver of prescription drug costs

Id. at 946–52.
Id. at 950–52.
386 Id. at 941–42.
387 Rebecca Wolitz, Recent Litigation Developments Regarding Drug Pricing and Access, SLS L. & BIOSCIENCES BLOG (Jan. 3, 2020), https://law.stanford.edu/2020/01/03/recent-litigation-developments-regarding-drug-pricing-and-access/ (discussing California’s drug price transparency law).
388 Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26, at 950–51.
384
385
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. . . [and] [i]ncreases in the price of widely used, existing drugs—not
market entry of new drugs—are the primary driver of the rising cost of
brand-name drugs . . . .”389 While specific, dramatic examples of price
increases—for instance, the 5000 percent increase of Daraprim—make
the news, price increases on drugs are a mundane matter and are taken
in the absence of meaningful, if any, justification.390
Current state-level unsupported or excessive price increase
proposals seek to address this concerning practice through a tax or
penalty. Drug manufacturers remain free to set initial prices, but if a
manufacturer increases the price of its drug beyond specified criteria, a
portion of that excessive increase will be penalized. Would such a tax
penalty pose a problem from the perspective of patent preemption?
While it will be important for future work to determine the exact limits
on a state’s power to tax in this context, as an initial matter, U.S. Supreme
Court precedent establishes that states may tax both patented products
and patent royalties.
As already noted, the Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated
states’ authority to regulate patented products. Given that patent rights
grant only a right to exclude, these rights do not conflict with “the power
of the states to exercise control over articles manufactured by patentees
. . . .”391 The power of states over patented products has explicitly
included the power to tax these physical embodiments of intangible
property. “And the right conferred by the patent laws of the United
States to inventors . . . does not take the tangible property, in which the
invention or discovery may be exhibited or carried into effect, from the
operation of the tax and license laws of the State.”392
Likewise, the Court eventually came around to the view that states
may tax patent (and copyright) royalties themselves.393 In Fox Film

Mello & Riley, supra note 108, at 1599–1600.
See Michelle Mello & Stacie B. Dusetzina, NASHP’s Proposal for Imposing Penalties
on Excessive Price Increases for Prescription Drugs (Aug. 14, 2020), https://
www.nashp.org/nashps-proposal-for-imposing-penalties-on-excessive-price-increases-for-prescription-drugs/#toggle-id-1; Michael A. Carrier, Higher Drug Prices
from Anticompetitive Conduct: Three Case Studies, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 151, 152 (2019); Ed
Silverman, Regeneron CEO Spars with Counterparts, Calling Many Price Hikes ‘Ridiculous,’
STAT NEWS (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/12/02/regeneron-drug-prices-pfizer/.
391 Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142, 148 (1928), overruled in part by Fox Film Corp.
v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932).
392 Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 347 (1880); see also Patterson v. Kentucky, 97
U.S. 501, 501 (1878).
393 Fox Film Corp., 286 U.S. at 126 (overruling Long v. Rockwood); Hrdy, The
Reemergence of State Anti-Patent Law, supra note 320, at 185 (describing the end of the
“per se ban on state taxation of patent royalties”).
389
390
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Corp. v. Doyal, the state of Georgia sought to collect taxes on a company’s
gross receipts of copyright royalties. The company argued that because
this intellectual property right was created by the federal government
to fulfil a federal government purpose, copyright royalties were to be
immune from state taxation. This argument proved unpersuasive. The
Court found that Congress did not “provide that the right, or the gains
from its exercise, should be free of tax. . . . the mere fact that a property
right is created by statute to fulfill a governmental purpose does not
make it nontaxable . . . .”394 Furthermore, the Court explicitly found the
same to be true of royalties derived from patents, thereby overruling a
prior ruling to the contrary.395
For these reasons, again with the caveat that limits on such tax
powers require further investigation including beyond their
intersection with patent law, state-level unsupported or excessive price
increase legislation is highly attractive. From a patent perspective,
prima facie, at least some form of such legislation appears to have a
strong chance of legal survival. Furthermore, as others have advocated,
from a policy perspective, unsupported or excessive price increase
legislation could be a “policy win-win”: it will either prevent excessive
price increases or generate new state revenue.396 Ensuring reallocation
of at least some of that revenue to assist patients with out-of-pocket
costs will be an important design feature.397
An exclusive focus on excessive price increases is both a feature
and a bug. Such proposals leave drug manufacturers free to set initial
prices as they wish. Thus, on the one hand, this approach avoids many
of the messy and complicated questions surrounding determinations of
price excessiveness that could stymie the implementation of more
general drug price-gouging laws discussed above. On the other hand,
this also means that the important matter of whether and when a drug’s
underlying price is itself excessive remains unexamined. Such measures
might, commendably, stop a wound from getting worse, but do not make
that initial wound go away. Moreover, such laws could be vulnerable to

Fox Film Corp., 286 U.S. at 127–29.
Id. at 131 (“[I]n this aspect royalties from copyrights stand in the same position
as royalties from the use of patent rights, and what we have said as to the purposes of
the government in relation to copyrights applies as well, mutatis mutandis, to patents
which are granted under the same constitutional authority to promote the progress of
science and useful arts.”).
396 Mello & Riley, supra note 108, at 1600.
397 See H.B. 30 § 5(b)(1), 31st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2021), https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2021/bills/HB30_.HTM; NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y, supra note
191 (stating in FAQ of model legislation that “the revenue from the penalty would be
used to offset costs to consumers”).
394
395
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gaming.398 Anticipating the effects of excessive price increase laws, drug
manufacturers introducing new drugs could be incentivized to simply
account for money that would otherwise be lost to a tax penalty by
raising initial prices accordingly. For these reasons, excessive price
increase legislation implemented through a tax penalty is not a
comprehensive solution to the problem of excessively priced patented
medications. It would “require companion legislation,”399 which given
the existing legal landscape surrounding patent preemption, payment
regulation is a plausible candidate.400
E. Payment Regulation
State-level payment regulation of excessive patented drug prices
lacks the doctrinal nuances that attend state-level excessive price
regulation; it straightforwardly avoids issues of patent preemption
entirely.401 Not only is payment regulation within traditional state
police powers, but neither the Hatch-Waxman Act nor the BPCIA bear
on state payment regulation for the purchase or reimbursement of
patented products at all. A congressional purpose to incentivize
innovation through patent rights is not in conflict with state payment
regulation. Payment regulation does not regulate the exclusive rights
offered by a patent and does not even regulate the prices that can be
charged for patented products. It regulates what consumers and
purchasers can pay for medications, including those that are patented.
Unlike general, or comprehensive excessive price regulation,
payment ceilings leave drug manufacturers free to charge whatever
they would like. Payment regulation does not in any way regulate
patent rights nor their potential patent-derived rewards. It is true that
payment regulation does regulate innovation incentives. As others
observe in the context of Medicare, “[h]ealthcare reimbursements are
innovation incentives. Indeed, they may be among the largest
innovation incentives in the pharmaceutical sector.”402 But the
incentives offered by healthcare reimbursements are distinct from
those offered by the patent system. Regulation of one does not entail
the regulation of the other.
Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26, at 954.
Mello & Riley, supra note 108, at 1600.
400 Cf. Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26, at 955–56 (recommending a two-prong
approach modeled on consumer lending law in which a statute addresses excessive
price increases and a separate mechanism imposing a general prohibition on excessive
drug prices that would reach launch prices as well).
401 See also Feldman et al., supra note 45, at 57 (reaching this conclusion specifically
for DABs).
402 Lemley, Ouellette, & Sachs, supra note 74, at 107.
398
399
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Thus, while a general excessive price regulation scheme is
preferable to payment regulation, as a pragmatic and workable secondsecond-best intervention from the perspective of patent preemption,
payment regulation is presently the less risky candidate. Payment
regulation offers a workaround for states to control costs and facilitate
access to more affordable medications. Further, existing payment
regulation proposals for DABs have sought to address the setting of
payment ceilings through affordability metrics as opposed to drug
manufacturers’ financial information. In so doing, they avoid some of
the problems that could impede a price regulation approach.403
Payment regulation, however, has drawbacks. In addition to the
moral and political issues discussed earlier, DABs potentially face three
pragmatic problems, some of which may be shared by a general price
regulation approach. First, there are challenges surrounding the
possibility of market exit. Though unlikely to be an issue when there are
multiple therapeutic alternatives,404 it could be a problem particularly
when a drug is the only one in its class. The strength of this worry
corresponds with the specific state setting payment rates and the size of
its market. Drug manufacturers may, for instance, be more reluctant to
walk away from the California state payer and purchaser market as
opposed to Rhode Island’s. The problem of market exit might be abated
if multiple states set up DABs and identify the same drug as presenting
affordability challenges. Leaving is less attractive if other markets are
no more attractive.
Another issue pertinent to market exit is consideration of the
Medicaid best price rule. Medicaid is entitled to the lowest price of a
drug with certain exclusions.405 Thus, a concern of drug manufacturers
may not be the potential market size of sales forgone in a state, but the
ripple effect a lower price in say, Rhode Island, could have throughout
the system.
A second potential problem facing payment regulation in the
particular form of DABs is its administrability. DABs may be too
complex and resource intensive for states, particularly if there are
budget shortfalls. On this issue, a general excessive price regulation in
the form of a price-gouging statute could be an easier lift—but it
depends. Proposals often involve a provided standard for what
constitutes an excessive price, and, typically, the state’s attorney general
Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26, at 952.
NAT’L ACAD. FOR ST. HEALTH POL’Y, Maryland Rate-Setting Legislation Question and
Answer (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nashp.org/maryland-rate-setting-legislationquestion-and-answer/#q8 (“Question 8”).
405 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(1)(A)(ii)(I)–(C)(i).
403
404
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is tasked with enforcement.406 For the reasons discussed above,
however, excessive price regulations may or may not be less resource
intensive for states. If states need to (and are permitted to) demonstrate
that their regulations pose no obstacle to federal law, the practical
viability of this depends on whether a suitable shorthand for defining
excessive pricing by reference to sufficient pricing can be defended. If,
to make such a showing, states ultimately need to engage with complex
assessments of sufficient innovation incentives, these assessments may
be better suited to a state agency with technical, domain relevant
expertise, as opposed to leaving these determinations to the judiciary.
If this is the case, setting up such an administrative structure would
appear to put the prospect of general state excessive price regulation—
in terms of administration and resources—in line with DABs. Further,
there may be increased practical challenges to procuring the underlying
information necessary to make determinations regarding adequate
incentives.407
Finally, a third potential problem facing payment regulation is the
risk that rates may be set too low, thereby disincentivizing research and
development into new therapies. With a focus on affordability, “if DABs
err on the side of strict payment limits in the short term, they risk
discouraging investment in drug research and development if the limits
were widely adopted—an issue of obvious import for consumer
welfare.”408 Thus, this concern is not simply a variation on market exit,
but one of failed market entrance. From a patent preemption
perspective, DABs are completely free in how they set their rates. This
raises the prospect that rates could be too favorable towards states in
promoting short term affordability goals. While one state in isolation
setting such rates may be of limited impact, if aggregated across many
states, this could be cause for concern. DABs could ensure there is an
adequate floor on their rates, but in their current form, this is not part
of their mandate. General excessive price regulation, by contrast, could
have the benefit of explicitly regulating those prices that are excessive
by reference to the goals of federal patent law.
In contrast to general excessive price regulation, under the existing
legal landscape, excessive price increase regulation implemented
through a tax retains some comparative practical advantages over DABs.
Any problems of market exit may be blunted by the ability of drug
manufacturers to still set their own prices. Depending upon the model’s
406 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 2-801, 2-803; see also Mello & Wolitz, supra
note 26, at 877–79 (discussing Maryland’s now defunct anti-price-gouging law).
407 See also Mello & Wolitz, supra note 26.
408 Id. at 950.
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particulars, the administrability of unsupported price increase laws
could be less onerous. Some proposals, for instance, incorporate
reliance on determinations made independently and at no cost to states
by the Institute for Clinical and Economic Research (“ICER”). ICER
evaluates and identifies price increases that are unsupported by clinical
evidence, and states could rely on this work to determine which price
increases ought to be penalized.409 Other proposals, such as the one
advanced by Massachusetts, could be more labor and resource
intensive.410 Unsupported or excessive price increase proposals also
would seem to sidestep any plausible concerns about disincentivizing
important new research. Since tax penalties are imposed merely on
price increases benchmarked against the consumer price index or
determinations of a lack of supporting clinical evidence, drug
manufacturers still have great leeway to price as they wish through
launch prices.
As already mentioned, this poses a significant potential
disadvantage of excessive price increase legislation. Given its structure,
it will not address any excessiveness in the underlying prices upon
which price increases are taken. Depending on the proposal’s
particulars, it further “may or may not” actually prevent price hikes.411
Unsupported or excessive price increase legislation therefore is likely a
tool best paired with other efforts.
For these reasons, to the extent more comprehensive reform is
possible, despite its potential challenges, payment regulation—from a
patent preemption perspective—emerges as the presently most
expedient policy tool of those considered to comprehensively address
the problem of excessively priced patented medications. It is less risky
than comprehensive excessive price regulation given existing patent
precedent. It further appears to be a more facile approach given the
unlikeliness of a targeted congressional amendment in the near future
and the nascency of exploring future uses of sovereign immunity. It
could be enhanced if paired with unsupported or excessive price
increase legislation. Finally, payment regulation schemes have the
benefit of early-stage state experimentation in implementation already
being underway.

409 Under their discussion sub-heading “What Administrative Feasibility Concerns
Arise?” Mello & Dusetzina consider state legislative reliance on ICER’s evaluations.
Mello & Dusetzina, supra note 390.
410 Id.
411 Id. (see discussion heading: “How Effective Would the Massachusetts Model Be?”).
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F. Reimagining States as Participants in Federal Patent Policy
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that states should have the
authority to step in and fill the institutional vacuum left by federal law.
Federal abdication of patented drug price regulation is suboptimal, but
preemption in light of this regulatory vacuum is even worse. States can
and should be able to serve as our second-best solution to excessively
priced patented medications. For the reasons provided above, patent
preemption of excessive drug price regulation is neither legally required
nor good policy. State regulation of excessively priced patented
medications would improve physical and fiscal health and promote
democratic preferences for reform.
State participation in excessive price regulation can further have
desirable effects on calibrating and refining federal pharmaceutical
innovation policy. Patent law and policy are commonly regarded as
dominantly federal.412 But the prospect of state engagement in patented
drug price and payment regulation reveals that states can be
foregrounded as active participants in promoting and shaping the
contours of patent policy. Through price and payment regulation, states
can assume the role of collaborators and influencers.
Unfettered by patent preemption, states can recalibrate federal
patent innovation policy to align with its intended public-serving
purpose. States can be collaborators in promoting the ends of federal
patent law. The goal of states is to protect the health and welfare of their
citizens through identifying and correcting for egregious instances of
excessive pricing. In so doing, they promote the instrumental purpose
of patents to serve the public, as opposed to privileging private gain.
State drug price regulation would work towards bringing about the best
version of our national innovation system.
As argued above, it is prima facie likely that overcompensation of
pharmaceutical patent holders occurs. With lives literally on the line, if
states are willing to shoulder the task of determining when egregious
overcompensation occurs and when the purpose of patent incentives
therefore are not being optimally served, they should not be thwarted.
Rather than view state excessive drug price regulation as intrusive
incursions on federal prerogative, these efforts should be recast as
collaborative.
State regulation further serves as a vehicle for manifesting the
overwhelming and ignored bipartisan preference for drug pricing
reform. Americans want drug price reform, but the federal government
historically has been resiliently unresponsive. While recent
412

See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11, 12 (2014).
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congressional movement has been encouraging, it remains uncertain
whether any drug pricing reform provisions will ultimately become law,
and if so, what their final form will be. Few would dispute that the best
version of a patent system is one that minimizes inefficiencies and treats
others fairly. The mandate for a more efficient system is particularly
pressing when lives, human health, and the state provision of social and
medical services are needlessly curtailed to overcompensate patent
holders. Under present circumstances, to the extent that more general,
comprehensive state excessive patented drug price regulation is patent
preempted, this is a missed opportunity and contrary to bipartisan
democratic preferences.413
Finally, state experimentation with drug price regulation is a
thriving laboratory of democracy for pharmaceutical innovation policy
design. State regulation as a means for addressing the affordability of
high-cost patented medications presents opportunities for states to
influence both innovation policy and associated conversations
regarding fair drug pricing. With respect to payment regulation, as
already noted, “[h]ealthcare reimbursements are innovation
incentives.”414 Insurer coverage and payment rates function as “marketbased prizes, in which the reward incorporates both a government
assessment of social value and market information based on consumer
choices.”415 Reimbursement rates can shape the allocation of incentives
among different kinds of therapies. Admittedly, these effects may be
greatly attenuated in the context of state excessive drug payment
reform depending upon the state and how pervasive these reforms are
among states. This may mean this insight translates in theory, but not
practice. Nevertheless, it is important to mark this possibility.
Perhaps even more important than states’ potential influence over
the allocation of innovation incentives is their influence on the national
conversation of what constitutes fair or unfair patented drug pricing.
States need not passively accept the unchecked excessive pricing
perpetuated by lax federal regulation. They are, after all, direct
participants in the system as purchasers and payers; they have
responsibilities as stewards of scarce resources. Through price and
payment regulation, states have the opportunity to advocate for their
needs and values and to overlay these considerations on federal patent
policy. They participate in the push and pull of balancing innovation
incentives with public access to novel therapies, and grapple with how
to set justified ceilings on drug expenditures. Innovation incentives are
413
414
415

See Buck, supra note 117.
Lemley, Ouellette, & Sachs, supra note 74, at 107.
Id. at 106.
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important, but they are not the only thing that matters. States as
purchasers and payers of patented prescription medications also care
about affordability, clinical and social value, and protecting their
citizens and health systems from paying far more than necessary for the
important medications our nation needs. States have a lot to contribute
to these contentious conversations, and all the more so if they may
speak from the direct experience gained through experimentation with
patented drug pricing reform.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of federal patent law is public. Its aim is to bring forth
new inventions and only instrumentally to reward patent-holders. It is
reasonable to think that overcompensation of drug manufacturers, by
reference to the aims of federal patent law, occurs. Against the
background of widespread unaffordability of necessary medications,
regulation of drug manufacturers’ excessive compensation, when it
occurs, is both consistent with the purpose of patent law to incentivize
innovation and morally compelling on grounds of fairness.
Federal resolution of the problem of excessively priced patented
medications is preferred. Despite bipartisan support for reform,
however, congressional action has been stalled and continues to be
politically uncertain. In the interim, a search for second-best solutions
is urgent both for patients and states. Fortunately, in a federal system,
states present the possibility of alternative reformers. In contrast to the
federal government, states possess the demonstrated political ability to
enact a variety of legislation and have been active in experimenting with
drug pricing reforms.
States have been stymied in these efforts by misguided existing
Federal Circuit precedent. This precedent needs to be corrected or
avoided. Comprehensive state excessive drug price regulation need not
pose an obstacle to the incentives offered by the federal patent scheme.
Further, in light of urgent needs, leaving the regulatory vacuum created
by the federal government unaddressed is undesirable as a matter of
public policy. To the contrary, states have an important role to play in
tackling the problem of excessively priced patented medications and an
underappreciated ability to recalibrate federal pharmaceutical
innovation policy towards its intended public-serving purpose. Under
present conditions, to the extent states are patent preempted from
regulation reaching excessively priced patented drugs, this is a
significant and unwarranted missed opportunity.

